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Article 
PUNISHING ON A CURVE 
Adi Leibovitch 
ABSTRACT—Does the punishment of one defendant depend on how she 
fares in comparison to the other defendants on the judge’s docket? This 
Article demonstrates that the troubling answer is yes. Judges sentence a 
given offense more harshly when their caseloads contain relatively milder 
offenses and more leniently when their caseloads contain more serious 
crimes. I call this phenomenon “punishing on a curve.” 
Consequently, this Article shows how such relative sentencing 
patterns put into question the prevailing practice of establishing specialized 
courts and courts of limited jurisdiction. Because judges punish on a curve, 
a court’s jurisdictional scope systematically shapes sentencing outcomes. 
Courts of limited jurisdiction usually specialize in relatively less serious 
crimes—such as misdemeanors, drug offenses, or juvenile cases. They treat 
the mild offenses on their docket more harshly than generalist courts that 
also see severe crimes. This leads to the disturbing effect of increasing 
punitive outcomes vis-à-vis these offenses, wholly contradictory to the 
missions of these courts. Such sentencing patterns undermine notions of 
justice and equitable treatment. They also undermine retributive principles 
and marginal deterrence across crimes of increasing severity. 
In light of the profound normative and practical implications, this 
Article proposes a remedy to standardize sentences through “curving 
discretion.” In addition to consulting the sentencing range recommended by 
the sentencing guidelines for a particular offense, a judge should see the 
distribution of sentences for the same offense across different courts. This 
Article illustrates the feasibility of this proposal empirically using 
sentencing data from neighboring judicial districts in Pennsylvania. It also 
explains how this proposal fits within the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
following United States v. Booker, which rendered sentencing guidelines 
advisory, and its potential advantage to improve appellate review. 
AUTHOR—Associate Professor, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Faculty 
of Law. For helpful comments and discussions, I thank Ronen Avraham, 
Omri Ben-Shahar, Tony Casey, Zohar Goshen, Jamal Greene, Sasha 
Greenawalt, Bernard Harcourt, Bert Huang, William Hubbard, Avery Katz, 
Ryan Liss, Anna Lvovsky, Richard McAdams, Ed Morrison, Ariel Porat, 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1206 
Eric Posner, J.J. Prescott, John Rappaport, Gabriel Rauterberg, Daniel 
Richman, Elizabeth Scott, Matthew Stephenson, Marah Stith McLeod, Eric 
Talley, and workshop participants at the University of Chicago Law 
School, Columbia Law School, George Mason University Antonin Scalia 
Law School, Georgetown University Law Center, Bar-Ilan University 
Faculty of Law, Haifa University Faculty of Law, the Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem Faculty of Law, and Tel Aviv University Buchmann Faculty of 
Law. I also thank the judges and court administrators at the first and second 
municipal district courts of Cook County, Illinois, for welcoming me into 
their courts.  
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1206	
I. THE THEORY OF RELATIVE JUDGMENTS ............................................................... 1213	
A. The Normative Role of Relative Severity ...................................................... 1213	
B. A Positive Psychological Theory of Relative Severity .................................. 1215	
II. JUDICIAL DOCKETS AND PUNISHMENT CURVES .................................................... 1226	
A. The Caseload Effect ...................................................................................... 1226	
B. Limited Jurisdiction, Limited Perspectives ................................................... 1227	
C.		Considerations for Case Assignments ........................................................... 1237	
III.	LESSONS FOR COURTS OF GENERAL, LIMITED, AND HYBRID JURISDICTION .......... 1243	
A. Operational Reasons for Limited Jurisdiction .............................................. 1244	
B. Substantive Reasons for Limited Jurisdiction ............................................... 1246	
IV.	STANDARDIZING THE PUNISHMENT CURVE ........................................................... 1250	
A. A Proposal for Curving Discretion ............................................................... 1251	
B. Curving Discretion and Sentencing Policy ................................................... 1270	
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 1279	
INTRODUCTION 
Assigning cases across courts and judges is commonly viewed as an 
administrative decision. Yet a comparative analysis of criminal courts 
reveals an astounding list of unintended consequences on the substance of 
legal decisions. Juvenile courts, for example, were established with an eye 
toward rehabilitation of adolescents, but from the Progressive Era through 
the twentieth century, these courts have often adopted more punitive 
sentencing and pretrial-release practices than those used by adult criminal 
courts.1 When misdemeanor and felony cases are assigned to separate 
1 See infra Section II.B.2. See generally LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE COURTS 106–09 
(2011) (discussing the history of the juvenile courts); Jeffrey Fagan, Separating the Men from the Boys: 
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divisions, the sentencing levels for misdemeanors sometimes exceed those 
of felonies involving similar conduct.2 With the division of geographic 
jurisdiction, not only do courts tend to develop different sentencing 
practices but a long line of research suggests they also follow a particular 
pattern: courts in rural and suburban areas tend to develop harsher 
sentencing practices than their counterparts in large urban locations.3 These 
observations have so far been regarded as unrelated. This Article argues 
they are not. 
This Article demonstrates that judicial decisions are based on a 
relative ranking of “blameworthiness”; judges compare the cases before 
them to others on their dockets. Judicial evaluation of blameworthiness, in 
other words, involves a relative judgment not an independent one. The 
cases on each judge’s docket form a particular “punishment curve” that 
serves as a benchmark for the sentencing decision in an individual case. 
Consequently, judges handling different dockets end up using different 
comparison groups as the benchmarks for their decisions so that particular 
cases are evaluated against different punishment curves. This phenomenon 
leads not only to troubling sentencing disparities but also to predictable and 
systemic biases across courts of different jurisdictions. 
The positive claim—which I support with quantitative and qualitative 
evidence—is that judges who are exposed only to relatively mild offenses 
(for example, misdemeanors) or offenders (for example, juveniles) tend to 
see those cases as relatively worse than they otherwise would. As a result, 
they may develop harsher sentencing practices than judges exposed to the 
full spectrum of criminal cases. 
This means that the decision about the types of cases before particular 
courts or judges is not merely administrative; it can affect substantive case 
outcomes. Where a court of limited jurisdiction is established as part of a 
broader mission to alter the treatment of certain offenses or offenders, it 
can even undermine that mission by nudging courts in exactly the opposite 
The Comparative Advantage of Juvenile Versus Criminal Court Sanctions on Recidivism Among 
Adolescent Felony Offenders, in SERIOUS, VIOLENT & CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFENDERS 238, 244 (James 
C. Howell et al. eds., 1995) (reviewing the competing findings comparing juveniles sentenced in
juvenile and adult courts); James C. Howell, Juvenile Transfers to the Criminal Justice System: State of
the Art, 18 LAW & POL’Y 17, 17 (1996) (same).
2 This happened, for example, with the sentencing of domestic violence offenses in Chicago in 
2010. See infra Section II.B.1. 
3 See, e.g., JAMES EISENSTEIN ET AL., THE CONTOURS OF JUSTICE: COMMUNITIES AND THEIR 
COURTS 278 (1988) (“[S]entences in larger jurisdictions will be less severe.”); Jeffery T. Ulmer & Brian 
Johnson, Sentencing in Context: A Multilevel Analysis, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 137, 168 (2004) (“[C]ourt 
size produces distinctive sentencing patterns, with large urban courts exhibiting the most lenient 
sentencing.”); see also infra Section II.B.3. 
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of the intended direction. Courts that were designed to emphasize treatment 
and rehabilitation might be more punitive.4 Attempts to get tougher on 
crime can lead to unexpected leniency.5 Sometimes even more general 
policy goals, such as proportionality and marginal deterrence, are 
compromised.6 
In making the positive claim about judges’ “relative judgments,” this 
Article builds on two previously unrelated strands of literature. It connects 
(1) the experimental findings of social psychologists and behavioral
scholars who have analyzed the effects of context dependence on
decisionmaking with (2) the qualitative and quantitative field evidence
provided by sociologists, criminologists, and political scientists who have
documented sentencing trends and disparities across courts of different
jurisdictions. By bridging the two, this Article departs from the current
discourse in an important way. While each strand of the literature,
separately, has regarded the phenomena documented as arbitrary or ad hoc,
this Article identifies the potential for a systemic bias in a predicted
direction.
Behavioral law and economics scholars have repeatedly documented 
in experimental settings how, due to the contrast effect, “[t]he availability 
of comparison cases apparently makes a serious case appear more serious 
than it would on its own and makes a milder case appear milder.”7 But their 
focus has been on how such context dependence leads to “arbitrary,” 
“erratic,” and “unpredictable” judgments, mostly among jurors and 
laypersons.8 Their underlying assumption is that the absence of context 
causes jurors’ decisions to be erratic, which provides “a possible reason to 
favor judicial decisions over jury decisions, because judges are more likely 
to have a menu of cases before them.”9 Judges’ wider perspective does 
4 See infra Section II.B.2. 
5 See infra Section II.B.1. 
6 See infra Sections II.B.1–2. 
7 Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in 
Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2104 (1998) [hereinafter Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages]; see 
also Daniel Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards: The Psychology of Punitive 
Damages, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49, 59 (1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, The 
Cognitive Components of Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 457, 477 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein et al., 
Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1176 (2002) [hereinafter Sunstein et al., 
Predictably Incoherent Judgments]; infra Section I.B.2.a. 
8 Kahneman et al., supra note 7, at 75; see also Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages, supra 
note 7, at 2142. 
9 Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, supra note 7, at 1156–57; see also Sunstein et 
al., Assessing Punitive Damages, supra note 7, at 2079 (suggesting that “the legal system should 
provide a mechanism by which judges or administrators, instead of jurors, can translate the relevant 
moral judgments into dollar amounts”). 
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mitigate the problem of erratic decisionmaking yet it suffers from a 
separate problem worthy of attention. Because of their wider perspective, 
judges’ decisions can be tainted by comparison of a particular case to the 
other cases in their caseloads. In previous work, I demonstrated this claim 
empirically, showing that judges who were at first randomly exposed to 
milder offenses developed harsher sentencing practices than judges initially 
exposed to offenses that are more serious.10 In this Article, I build on those 
findings to develop a theory of how the institutional design of courts and 
the rules for case assignment can lead to a systemic bias in legal decisions 
in a predicted direction. 
Similarly, sociologists, criminologists, and political scientists have 
offered varying ad hoc explanations of documented differences across 
courts of differing jurisdictions. Differences in sentencing levels between 
specialized and generalist courts have been attributed to different 
perceptions by generalist judges of the uniqueness of cases from the 
specialized subject matter,11 political capture of the specialized courts by 
high-stakes constituents,12 or selection of judges with known policy and 
punitive preferences to staff such courts.13 The divergence between the 
intended purposes and unintended consequences of some specialized courts 
have also been explained by such factors as well as by the oversight of 
10 Adi Leibovitch, Relative Judgments, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 281 (2016). I discuss the empirical 
findings in greater detail in Section I.B.2.c. 
11 BAUM, supra note 1, at 35–36, explains how immersion in a subject matter can shape judicial 
policy through increased confidence—and subsequently greater willingness to overturn decisions and 
change policy—but also exposes judges to insularity, making them susceptible to biases and stereotypes 
about particular types of cases. The concentration of offenses in a specialized docket can also signal to 
judges “that the offense should be taken seriously” and lead to increased punishments. Id. at 102. 
12 Interests groups can shape the policy developed in specialized courts in several ways: they can 
promote the establishment of specialized courts emphasizing a particular policy orientation, id. at 133, 
they can affect the selection of judges to such courts, and they can influence sitting judges to develop 
the law a certain way thanks to their advantage as repeat players in the courts, id. at 37–39. 
13 Judges who staff juvenile, drug, and mental health courts, for example, are often chosen based on 
their sympathy toward and enthusiasm about the court’s mission. Id. at 37–38, 40, 221. When 
policymakers aim to get tougher on crime, other examples are more flagrant. In Philadelphia, the first 
city to establish specialized dockets for homicide cases in the 1970s, “[p]rosecutors have been able to 
knock lenient judges out of the program and steer the most serious cases to a handful of those most 
sympathetic to their charges.” Tina Rosenberg, The Deadliest D.A., N.Y. TIMES MAG. (July 16, 1995), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/16/magazine/the-deadliest-da.html? [https://perma.cc/S2F4-MJRL]. 
Chicago’s Speeders’ Court “was assigned a judge who did not own an automobile and who was not 
owned by the owner of any automobile.” Herbert Harley, Business Management for the Courts, 5 VA. 
L. REV. 1, 11 (1917). The first gun court, established in Providence in 1994, was “staffed by a judge
who had once sentenced a defendant to death despite the absence of capital punishment in Rhode
Island,” BAUM, supra note 1, at 220, and received the nickname “Maximum John,” Gun Court Triggers
Delight in Rhode Island, DESERET NEWS (Dec. 9, 1994), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/
392266/GUN-COURT-TRIGGERS-DELIGHT-IN-RHODE-ISLAND.html [https://perma.cc/XJX5-
LWJU]. 
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policymakers—designing such courts “on the basis of . . . folk theories, 
commonsense notions that do not fully accord with reality.”14 Across 
district courthouses, sentencing patterns have been explained by a long list 
of factors,15 including caseload pressure, attitudes toward plea bargaining, 
local perceptions of crime, courtroom organization and resources, and court 
communities’ ties and norms.16 This Article highlights the pattern that 
emerges from these studies—a negative relationship between sentencing 
outcomes and the scope of criminal severity within a court’s jurisdiction—
as well as how relative-judgments bias therefore offers an additional, 
unifying explanation to their findings. An explanation that, through its 
greater generalizability, entails not only descriptive but predictive force. 
From the institutional design perspective, the anomalous sentencing 
patterns that result from relative judgments highlight the importance of 
accounting for the potential unintended consequences of caseload exposure 
when assigning cases and responsibilities across courts. More generally, 
they call attention to the role of sentencing guidelines in promoting 
sentencing uniformity and to the limitations that impede them from 
achieving that goal. For more than three decades, sentencing guidelines 
across jurisdictions have not substantially changed in form—classifying 
offenses by recommending ex ante ranges for sentences. Yet with the 
advancement of and increased reliance on computerized systems in the 
courts to calculate sentencing recommendations and with the collection of 
sentencing information by sentencing commissions statewide and 
nationwide, the time is ripe to rethink how sentencing matrices and 
recommendations are developed. 
This Article proposes to standardize sentences by complementing 
existing sentencing guidelines with “statistical curving”: in addition to 
consulting the sentencing range recommended by the sentencing guidelines 
for a particular offense, a judge should see the distribution of sentences for 
the same offense across different courts. Displaying the overall punishment 
14 BAUM, supra note 1, at 5. 
15 For an overview of the literature, see Brian D. Johnson, Contextual Disparities in Guidelines 
Departures: Courtroom Social Contexts, Guidelines Compliance, and Extralegal Disparities in 
Criminal Sentencing, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 761 (2005). See also infra Section II.B.3. 
16 EISENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 768 (describing “court communities” as manifested in the 
interdependencies of court personnel; power and status relations among judges on the court; local 
customs; and the characteristics of the court environment, including perceptions in the county, type of 
legal representation, demographics, and socioeconomic parameters); JEFFERY T. ULMER, SOCIAL 
WORLDS OF SENTENCING: COURT COMMUNITIES UNDER SENTENCING GUIDELINES (1997) (defining the 
“distinctive social worlds” of different courts based on participants’ shared workplace, interdependent 
working relations between key sponsoring agencies—the prosecutor’s office, judges, and the defense 
bar—and distinctive legal and organizational cultures, such as norms regarding guidelines compliance 
or rates of substantial assistance departures). 
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curve would help judges conform to general sentencing practices in a way 
that would increase consistency, granularity, and uniformity in sentencing. 
This kind of statistical curving of discretion also offers several additional 
benefits. Because such statistical curving would serve as advisory guidance 
based on judicial decisions themselves, it would not impose external 
rigidity. Because it is informative about actual sentencing practices, it 
would facilitate appellate review. Because it is based on actual sentences 
imposed by judges, it may also answer the concerns that are sometimes 
raised about the institutional roles of legislators, judges, and prosecutors in 
shaping sentencing levels. 
By developing a theory of relative judgments based on different 
punishment curves, this Article makes three main contributions. First, it 
identifies a neglected mechanism for why and how sentencing practices are 
formed through the composition of judicial dockets. Second, by connecting 
the findings of court scholars under one unifying conceptual framework, 
this Article develops a prescriptive account of the connection between 
institutional capacity and policy outcomes in the criminal justice system. 
Lastly, this Article identifies the limited exposure from caseloads as the 
source of the bias and offers a solution to standardize sentencing over a 
joint curve. 
This Article also contributes to the broader sentencing guidelines 
discourse by refocusing on the commitment to uniformity of sentencing. 
For more than three decades, debates around sentencing guidelines have 
revolved mainly around the guidelines’ rigidity and the resulting harshness 
of sentencing outcomes.17 Under the classic account, relaxing the rigidity of 
sentencing guidelines and increasing judicial discretion sacrifices some 
uniformity for the sake of a greater emphasis on individuality in 
17 Compare, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III, Dead Law Walking: The Surprising Tenacity of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1227, 1230 (2014) [hereinafter Bowman, Dead Law 
Walking] (describing how the federal sentencing regime founded by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 
was “widely criticized by the defense bar and many in the judiciary and the academy for being unduly 
inflexible and unremittingly harsh”), Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1328 (2005) [hereinafter Bowman, 
Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines] (“At or near the root of virtually every serious criticism 
of the guidelines is the concern that they are too harsh . . . .”), and David Yellen, Reforming the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines’ Misguided Approach to Real-Offense Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. REV. 267, 268 
(2005) (describing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as “overly rigid and complex”), with Paul G. 
Cassell, Too Severe?: A Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (and a Critique of Federal 
Mandatory Minimums), 56 STAN. L. REV. 1017, 1017–18 (2004) (arguing that the Guidelines 
themselves are not too severe but rather that the problem is with statutes prescribing mandatory 
minimum sentences and preventing downward departures), and Thomas N. Whiteside, Reality of 
Federal Sentencing: Beyond the Criticism, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1574, 1577, 1591 (1996) (arguing that 
the severity of the Guidelines mostly results from federal statutes and that the Guidelines have 
“maintained significant judicial discretion over sentences”). 
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sentencing.18 The bias identified by this Article, however, undermines such 
a dichotomous account. When the judicial decision in a particular case is 
affected by the characteristics of the other cases in a judge’s caseload, the 
outcome reflects neither uniformity nor individuality in sentencing. 
This concern is intensified by a particular design feature of specialized 
courts that has mostly escaped scholarly attention: courts of limited 
jurisdiction (such as drug courts, veterans courts, or juvenile courts) are 
usually specialized around categories of relatively less serious crimes and 
their jurisdiction is often restricted to misdemeanors or low-class felonies.19 
If exposure to less serious offenses leads judges to view particular cases as 
relatively worse and sentence them more harshly, then lack of uniformity is 
also inevitably tied to increased punitiveness by the very design of the 
compartmentalized criminal justice system. 
The theory presented in this Article may be applied beyond criminal 
sentencing decisions. It is relevant to the decisionmaking processes of other 
actors in the criminal justice system—from police officers to prosecutors to 
parole boards. It is relevant to other judicial decisions in criminal cases 
such as those about pretrial confinement and setting bail. It is relevant to 
judicial decisions in civil cases as well as decisions by administrative 
18 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less 
Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901 (1991); Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of 
Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1703 (1992); 
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem is Uniformity, Not 
Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833 (1992). 
19 Many states, for example, assign misdemeanor cases to particular judges or to separate municipal 
or criminal courts of limited jurisdiction. The National Center for State Courts (NCSC) offers 
comprehensive charts summarizing the court structures in all U.S. states. COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, 
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT STRUCTURE CHARTS (2013), 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/State_Court_Structure_Charts.aspx [https://perma.cc/
2YPM-NCDX]; see also infra notes 106–09 and accompanying text. Domestic violence courts are often 
limited to hearing only misdemeanors or Class-D felonies. See, e.g., GENERAL ORDERS OF THE CIRCUIT 
COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, Nos. 1.2, 2.1(g) (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.cookcountycourt.org/
Manage/DivisionOrders/ViewDivisionOrder/tabid/298/ArticleId/188/GENERAL-ORDER-NO-1-2-2-1-
County-Department.aspx [https://perma.cc/PK9X-3LDZ]; see also infra notes 120, 124–25 and 
accompanying text (discussing Illinois). Juvenile courts handle adolescents who are viewed as lesser 
offenders usually with no prior criminal record, and the most serious felonies are commonly excluded, 
either mandatorily or presumptively, from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and transferred to the 
adult criminal court. PATRICK GRIFFIN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & 
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS (2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/ojjdp/232434.pdf [https://perma.cc/2D49-E4XJ]. Veterans courts focus mostly on nonviolent 
and largely misdemeanor offenses. Michael Daly Hawkins, Coming Home: Accommodating the Special 
Needs of Military Veterans to the Criminal Justice System, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 563, 564, 566, 571 
(2010). Many drug courts exclude defendants charged with felonies or violent crimes. NAT’L ASS’N OF 
CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, AMERICA’S PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: THE CRIMINAL COSTS OF 
TREATMENT AND THE CASE FOR REFORM 22 (2009), https://www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/
DownloadAsset.aspx?id=20217 [https://perma.cc/NF2W-VDVD]. 
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agencies. In some of these realms, there is qualitative evidence for such 
patterns, and I reference that evidence when relevant. But for the coherence 
of the argument, and because certain features of the different processes are 
worthy of particular attention, I focus this Article on judicial decisions of 
sentences. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I builds on psychological 
theory to develop a theory of why judges sentence cases relative to their 
other cases. Part II demonstrates how the problem of relative judgments 
can lead to unintended consequences on sentencing outcomes and offers 
evidence of such trends in sentencing from three types of jurisdictional 
assignments: (1) the assignment of misdemeanor and felony cases under a 
unified or a two-tiered model, (2) the institution of specialized courts 
dealing with particular types of offenses (such as domestic violence courts) 
or offenders (such as juvenile courts), and (3) the division of geographic 
jurisdiction across district courthouses. 
Parts III and IV then discuss ways to address the problem of punishing 
on a curve. Part III draws lessons for the institutional design of courts of 
general, limited, and hybrid jurisdictions. It explains how the concern of 
relative-judgments bias can tilt the scale toward preferring generalist court 
models where the underlying reasons for case assignments are 
administrative—as is for the division between misdemeanor and felony 
cases. But it also acknowledges that unification is often impractical for 
other forms of limited jurisdiction, like geographic jurisdiction, and can 
sometimes contradict the substantive benefits that specialized courts seek to 
achieve—especially in courts that are focused around a particular 
population of offenders or victims. Part IV offers a more general remedy: it 
proposes to create a general punishment curve by using information about 
the actual sentences imposed for offenses across judges and courts. Judges 
could then standardize the particular sentences they impose in accordance 
with the overall punishment curve. 
I. THE THEORY OF RELATIVE JUDGMENTS
A. The Normative Role of Relative Severity
Judicial decisions are prone to contextual influences because of the 
inherent relativity in the assessment of cases. Judicial decisionmaking 
requires comparing cases based on the gravity of the behavior, the 
circumstances surrounding it, the harm created by the illicit act, and the 
characteristics of the offender. The evaluation of all of these aspects can be 
affected by their existence and magnitudes in the relevant comparison 
group. 
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For criminal law in particular, relative severity has a central doctrinal 
role—the principle of proportionality. In its most basic form, it is the 
retributive command to let the punishment fit the crime by punishing 
criminals in proportion to the gravity of their acts. Punitive severity must 
accord with the severity of the crime.20 Deterrence theory focuses on the 
magnitude of social harm based on utilitarian justifications.21 Efficient 
deterrence requires specific and general deterrence relative to the costs and 
benefits associated with the act22 as well as marginal deterrence between 
acts of increasing severity.23 The higher the social harm imposed by the 
offense, the higher the penalty should be.24 
When the sanction involves incarceration, incapacitation is not free of 
comparative assessments. Incapacitation in the real world, as the United 
States’ mass incarceration crisis illuminates, is costly to administer and is 
bounded by the capacity of jail and prison facilities.25 Under a given 
resource constraint, even an incapacitation rationale must differentiate 
across offenders based on the relative danger they pose, the harm inflicted 
by their offenses, and their likelihood of reoffending—or at least based on 
some criterion for sorting. 
A just legal system must also treat cases with similar characteristics 
alike and those that differ differently.26 The desire for equitable treatment 
requires an assessment of when the circumstances of a particular case 
justify harsher or more lenient punishment and how to identify whether two 
cases are similar enough that they should be treated the same. Such 
comparisons are the means to guard against arbitrariness and to assess the 
reasonableness of a particular sentence. Relative severity, therefore, is a 
tenet of penal theory—a key element of both justifications for punishment 
and the way punishment is implemented in the courts. The crucial 
underlying question is: Relative to what? 
20 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2012); United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 
1976). 
21 § 3553(a)(2)(B); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 579 
(1884). 
22 CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER WRITINGS 10, 31 (Richard 
Bellamy ed., Richard Davies et al. trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995); Gary S. Becker, Crime and 
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 176–79 (1968). 
23 BECCARIA, supra note 22, at 21; Becker, supra note 22, at 179–80, 185–87. 
24 BECCARIA, supra note 22, at 19; Becker, supra note 22, at 185–86. 
25 See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 537–44 (2011); JEREMY TRAVIS ET AL., NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMS., THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES (2014), http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=18613 [https://perma.cc/3C7X-Y5FD]. 
26 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3, policy statement (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2016). 
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B. A Positive Psychological Theory of Relative Severity
Since there is no objective metric to relative severity, what emerges is 
an experience-based methodology. Judicial evaluations of severity are done 
not in relation to the entire possible spectrum of human behavior but to the 
limited spectrum that judges view on a regular basis. Judges compare a 
defendant in one case to defendants in other cases before them. 
The evaluation of severity relative to the contours of cases in judges’ 
caseloads exposes judges to the same psychological biases of context 
dependence that affect human decisionmaking more generally. 
Emphasizing the relative comparison within the sample can distort the 
relationship between cases in the sample and cases outside the sample. 
1. Evidence from Psychology.
a. Extracting similarities.—Similarity plays a fundamental role
in psychological theories of human knowledge and behavior.27 Comparing 
similarities and differences is how people categorize and classify objects, 
analyze meaning, form concepts, and make inferences and 
generalizations.28 It is how people evaluate the desirability of a particular 
choice or the merit of a particular issue.29 It is how judges evaluate the 
circumstances of a particular case. And like other judgments, similarity 
depends on the context and frame of reference.30 
Since objects or cases involve numerous potentially relevant 
dimensions for comparison, the outcome can depend on which dimensions 
are used and how they are weighed. One factor that affects the cognitive 
choice to emphasize certain factors over others is their diagnostic 
value⎯How relevant is the particular feature for the task at hand? To quote 
a classic example: 
[T]he feature “real” has no diagnostic value in the set of actual animals since
it is shared by all actual animals and hence cannot be used to classify them.
This feature, however, acquires considerable diagnostic value if the object set
is extended to include legendary animals, such as a centaur, a mermaid, or a
phoenix.31
In other words, the features of the members in the group can affect 
which dimensions of similarity will be used. Certain dimensions become 
more salient because they are useful to assess similarities and differences in 
27 See, e.g., Amos Tversky, Features of Similarity, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 327, 327 (1977). 
28 Id. 
29 For some prominent examples, see infra notes 47–51 and accompanying text. 
30 Tversky, supra note 27, at 340. 
31 Id. at 342. 
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comparison to other cases, and other dimensions are less salient if they are 
less useful.32 Features that are shared by all objects in the set cannot be used 
to classify objects and, therefore, become less salient, while the quality that 
is not shared across all members becomes salient because it is a key 
characteristic in sorting the group members into different categories.33 
The human tendency to group objects in a set around clusters also 
determines the diagnostic value of certain features. Such clusters are 
created in a way that maximizes the similarity of objects within a cluster 
and the dissimilarity of objects in different clusters.34 Consider another 
example using the animal kingdom: a whale may be clustered with a fish in 
comparison to land animals, but as a mammal it would be different from a 
fish in a comparison among marine creatures. Changing the composition of 
a set can therefore alter the clustering of objects and change the diagnostic 
value of associated features. 
The level of heterogeneity or homogeneity in the set of objects will 
affect the dimensions used for classification. When cases are 
heterogeneous, the analysis is based on more general features at a higher 
level of organization (for example, mammals, fish, and birds). 
Consequently, objects that can be grouped around a common dimension 
appear more similar to one another. When cases are more homogenous, the 
analysis becomes more granular and people apply more concrete 
distinctions within groups (for example, singing birds and poultry). The 
more homogenous caseloads are, the more dissimilar cases appear to be.35 
This means that similarity between two (or more) objects is both causal and 
derivative. It is causal in the sense that the similarity or difference across 
objects serves as the basis for classification and judgment. But it is also 
derived from the adopted classification that then influences the finding of 
similarity or lack thereof.36 
As a result, when people face different sets, their answers to the same 
question of evaluation can be different. The problem is that people do not 
properly discount how much their evaluations depend on the particular set 
under examination. In a long line of experiments subjects were simply 
asked⎯How similar are X and Y? Whether discussing geometric shapes,37 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 343–44. 
34 Id. at 342. 
35 Id. at 344. 
36 Id. 
37 Douglas L. Medin et al., Respects for Similarity, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 254, 261–64 (1993) 
(finding that descriptions of an ambiguous shape were affected by the features of the other shape with 
which it was presented). 
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drawings of faces,38 countries,39 animals,40 or musical instruments,41 the 
answers reflected a contextual evaluation rather than an independent one. 
b. Ranking severity.—Because human decisions are sensitive to
the context in which they are made, the composition of object sets distorts 
the difference between relative and absolute quality. People are affected by 
the sample of cases before them to such an extent that they do not just rate 
the qualities of different features; they rank them relative to those of the 
other cases in the encountered sample. Even when asked to assign absolute 
values, people’s estimations of any particular trait are affected by the 
location of the case relative to the range and skewness of the distribution of 
other cases with which it is presented.42 
When a case is presented together with relatively milder cases, it can 
be evaluated as absolutely worse and vice versa. In psychological studies, 
such effects have been documented over a wide array of subjects and 
decisionmakers. They have been documented to affect the estimation of 
actual physical magnitudes: when encountered together with milder stimuli, 
the same volume was evaluated as louder,43 the same object was found to 
weigh more,44 the same line appeared longer,45 and the same pattern 
38 Tversky, supra note 27, at 342 (showing that the features of a third face presented to the group 
largely determined which of two faces was chosen as most similar to the target). 
39 Id. at 344 (asking subjects which of two countries is most similar to a target country and finding 
that subjects’ choices changed based on what the third country in the set was); Amos Tversky & Itamar 
Gati, Studies of Similarity, in COGNITION & CATEGORIZATION 79, 90–95 (Eleanor Rosch & Barbara B. 
Lloyd eds., 1978) (finding that the same pairs of neighboring countries were evaluated as more similar 
in a heterogeneous sample that included American and European pairs—where the feature of continent 
had diagnostic value—than in a homogenous sample that included only American or European pairs). 
40 Lennart Sjöberg & Christer Thorslund, A Classificatory Theory of Similarity, 40 PSYCHOL. RES.
223, 231–33 (1979) (finding that the similarity of pairs of mammals and birds increased when a more 
heterogeneous animal (i.e., a wasp) was added to the pool of pairs). 
41 Id. at 233–36 (demonstrating that the similarity of homogenous pairs of string instruments 
increased when heterogeneous pairs, including a string instrument and a wind instrument, were 
introduced into the list). 
42 Allen Parducci, Category Judgment: A Range-Frequency Model, 72 PSYCHOL. REV. 407, 408 
(1965); Allen Parducci, Contextual Effects: A Range-Frequency Analysis, in 2 HANDBOOK OF 
PERCEPTION: PSYCHOPHYSICAL JUDGMENT AND MEASUREMENT 127 (Edward C. Carterette & Morton 
P. Friedman eds., 1974); Allen Parducci, The Relativism of Absolute Judgments, SCI. AM., Dec. 1968, at
84 [hereinafter Parducci, Relativism of Absolute Judgments].
43 W.R. Garner, Context Effects and the Validity of Loudness Scales, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 218, 220–21 (1954); Allen Parducci & Arthur J. Sandusky, Limits on the Applicability of 
Signal Detection Theories, 7 PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSICS 63 (1970). 
44 Vincent Di Lollo, Contrast Effects in the Judgment of Lifted Weights, 68 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 383 (1964). 
45 Michael H. Birnbaum et al., Contextual Effects in Information Integration, 88 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 158 (1971); David L. Krantz & Donald T. Campbell, Separating Perceptual and Linguistic 
Effects of Context Shifts upon Absolute Judgments, 62 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 35 (1961). 
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appeared darker.46 Context affects not only physical attributes but also 
feelings, such as happiness and satisfaction,47 and evaluations of traits and 
normative opinions, such as judgments of merit48 or antisocial behavior.49 
These effects have been repeatedly documented not only among laypersons 
but also among experts such as psychiatrists50 and physicians51 in their 
medical diagnoses. 
2. Legal Applications.
a. Experimental evidence in the laboratory.—Both types of
cognitive effects have been applied to legal decisionmaking in 
experimental settings to study the evaluation of behaviors and harms as 
well as the assessment of punitive damages awards and criminal sentences. 
Parducci was the first to test the theory’s effect on the evaluation of 
moral or immoral behaviors. In his experiment, two groups of students 
were asked to evaluate the moral blameworthiness of different behaviors 
ranging from “[f]ailing to put back in the water lobsters which are shorter 
than the legal limit” to “[p]oisoning a neighbor’s dog whose barking 
bothers you.”52 The students were asked to judge the moral value of 
eighteen such acts.53 Six of the acts were common to both groups of 
students; the other twelve acts differed.54 One list contained relatively mild 
46 Barbara A. Mellers & Michael H. Birnbaum, Loci of Contextual Effects in Judgment, 8 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 582 (1982). 
47 Parducci, Relativism of Absolute Judgments, supra note 42, at 84–86. 
48 Barbara A. Mellers, Equity Judgment: A Revision of Aristotelian Views, 111 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 242 (1982); Barbara A. Mellers, “Fair” Allocations of Salaries and Taxes, 12 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 80 (1986). 
49 Parducci, Relativism of Absolute Judgments, supra note 42, at 84–87. 
50 Douglas H. Wedell et al., Reducing the Dependence of Clinical Judgment on the Immediate 
Context: Effects of Number of Categories and Type of Anchors, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
319 (1990) (describing experiments related to diagnoses of psychopathology). 
51 To name one astonishing example, in a classic study, 389 children were examined for a 
tonsillectomy. Each time, the group that a doctor found not to need an operation was sent to another 
doctor. Across three different physicians in this chain, each doctor always found about half of the 
children in a set⎯cleared by a previous doctor⎯in need of surgery. AM. CHILD HEALTH ASS’N, 
PHYSICAL DEFECTS: THE PATHWAY TO CORRECTION 80–96 (1934); see also ELIOT FREIDSON, 
PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF APPLIED KNOWLEDGE 256–57 (1970); 
Harry Bakwin, Pseudodoxia Pediatrica, 232 NEW ENG. J. MED. 691, 691–92 (1945); Brian H. 
Bornstein & A. Christine Emler, Rationality in Medical Decision Making: A Review of the Literature on 
Doctors’ Decision-Making Biases, 7 J. EVALUATION CLINICAL PRAC. 97, 100 (2001). Similar findings 
have been replicated for pediatricians’ likelihood to recommend tympanostomy tube placement and to 
order ambulatory radiography. John Z. Ayanian & Donald M. Berwick, Do Physicans [sic] Have a Bias 
Toward Action?: A Classic Study Revisited, 11 MED. DECISION MAKING 154 (1991). 
52 Parducci, Relativism of Absolute Judgments, supra note 42, at 87. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
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behaviors, such as “[c]heating at solitaire,” while the behaviors on the other 
list were much more troubling, such as “[u]sing guns on striking 
workers.”55 The students were instructed to rate each act based solely on 
their own moral judgment and to rate each act’s moral value independently 
as if it were the only one they were evaluating. Still, Parducci found that 
the same acts “were rated more leniently by students who judged them in 
the context of the nasty list than they were by those who encountered them 
in the context of relatively mild wrongdoing.”56 
A series of studies by Sunstein, Kahneman, Schade, and Ritov has 
demonstrated that the evaluation of severity for different harms and 
subsequent decisions about damage awards are also sensitive to the group 
of cases being evaluated. One experiment looked at perceptions of different 
categories of harm: physical injury and financial loss.57 When each case 
was evaluated in isolation, subjects emphasized within-category 
considerations58 and awarded similar damages in both cases.59 But when the 
two cases were evaluated together, subjects were reminded that personal 
injuries are much worse than financial losses, and the differences across 
categories dominated the decisions. While the damage awards in the 
financial-fraud case remained similar, damage awards for personal injury 
more than doubled from $1 million to $2.25 million.60 
In a later paper, Eisenberg, Rachlinski, and Wells showed that these 
findings are also supported by patterns from real cases.61 Judges ordinarily 
view cases involving varying types of harms while jurors view one case in 
isolation. And their decisions followed the predicted pattern: judges 
awarded higher damages than juries for personal injury cases and lower 
damages than juries for financial-loss cases.62 
Another experiment examined awards of punitive damages in personal 
injury cases that involved a plaintiff suing a firm.63 The experiment’s 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 84. 
57 Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, supra note 7, at 1174–75. 
58 Id. at 1174–76. 
59 Id. at 1176. The average median award was $1 million for personal injury cases and $800,000 for 
cases involving financial loss. 
60 Id. at 1177. In that setting, the fact that it was the evaluation of physical injury that was mainly 
affected was expected. Because personal injury cases are more readily available in people’s minds, the 
effect of the immediate comparison was mostly to increase the salience of the harm from the less 
prevalent category—the financial harm. 
61 Theodore Eisenberg et al., Reconciling Experimental Incoherence with Real-World Coherence in 
Punitive Damages, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1239 (2002). 
62 Id. at 1252–56. 
63 Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages, supra note 7. 
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vignettes differed in the harm the plaintiff was said to have suffered and in 
the size of the firm.64 When a particular case was viewed in isolation, there 
was a tendency toward diminished differentiation in judgments about 
different scenarios. When several cases were evaluated in quick succession, 
however, the availability of context improved people’s ability to 
discriminate among the cases and the range of awards increased.65 
Similar results have been reported for sentencing decisions. 
Rachlinski and Jourden conducted an experiment using two hypothetical 
cases: an outrageous example of a fraud case and a mild example of an 
armed robbery with an unloaded handgun.66 In each case, subjects were 
informed that a conviction carried a sentence of between two and fifteen 
years.67 When evaluated separately, subjects ordered sentences that were 
closer to the upper limit of the available sentencing range for the 
outrageous fraud case, an average sentence of 12.27 years.68 The average 
sentence ordered for the mild robbery case was 6.83 years.69 When the two 
cases were viewed together, however, the comparative severity of the cases 
became more salient. The comparison across cases mitigated the sentence 
of the defrauder by approximately 2 years from 12.27 to 10.39 years and 
increased the sentence of the robber by approximately 1 year from 6.83 to 
7.63 years.70 
In a study by Rodríguez and Blanco, students were presented with five 
cases sequentially.71 The last case was always the same robbery case, and it 
was preceded by either four relatively mild offenses or four relatively 
serious offenses.72 The students were asked to choose one of seven possible 
sentences for the robbery case ranging from twelve to thirty-six months in 
four-month increments.73 The authors found that the students exposed to a 
set of more severe crimes were more prone to impose lighter sentences 
(more often choosing twelve- or sixteen-month sentences) and less prone to 
impose harsher sentences (less often choosing thirty-two- or thirty-six-
month sentences) than the students exposed to milder cases.74 
64 Id. at 2095. 
65 Id. at 2104. 
66 Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note 7, at 467–68. 
67 Id. at 468. 
68 Id. at 477. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Gabriel Rodríguez & Sara Blanco, Contrast Effect on the Perception of the Severity of a 
Criminal Offence, 26 ANUARIO DE PSICOLOGÍA JURÍDICA 107 (2016). 
72 Id. at 109. 
73 Id. Because the experiment was conducted in Spain, the vignette followed Spanish law. 
74 Id. at 110. 
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The experimental findings focused on the immediate comparison 
across cases as a problem that can lead to arbitrariness in judgments. But in 
the same way contrast effect can change the relative evaluation of a case 
viewed against a more or less serious case, contrast effect in judicial 
decisionmaking can arise from the comparison between a particular case 
and the general caseload before the judge. 
b. Qualitative evidence from the field.—Legal scholars have not
researched a possible “caseload effect” in courts—where decisions in 
individual cases can be affected by the contours of the other cases in the 
judge’s caseload. But criminologists and sociologists have qualitatively 
documented such a phenomenon among other agencies in the criminal 
justice system.75 
Sociologists have suggested, for example, that police officers’ 
exposures to crime transform their evaluations of the severity of different 
crimes. Police officers working in higher crime areas view certain crimes, 
such as prostitution or drug violations, as less serious and more tolerable, 
while police officers in lower crime areas control these crimes vigilantly.76 
As Klinger explains: “The more criminals and criminal types that officers 
observe . . . [and] the more apparent criminal conduct . . . that officers see 
in public, the higher the perceived level of deviance.”77 
Police detectives similarly differed in which cases they investigated: 
“[I]n the context of the cases a detective or detail typically received for 
possible investigative action, what was considered a ‘big case’ for one 
detective was a ‘little case’ for another.”78 Battery cases were regarded as 
“little” cases and rarely investigated by police detectives from a major 
crimes detail, but they were viewed as “fairly important” cases at the 
juvenile detail.79 Urban police detectives regularly dealing with homicides 
“not only become[] ‘familiar’ with, hardened to, and less affected by such 
cases but also make[] finer, more varied distinctions between types of 
homicides . . . . [W]here killings make up the routine and regular work of 
75 For an extensive review of the literature, see Robert M. Emerson, Holistic Effects in Social 
Control Decision-Making, 17 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 425 (1983). 
76 David A. Klinger, Negotiating Order in Patrol Work: An Ecological Theory of Police Response 
to Deviance, 35 CRIMINOLOGY 277 (1997). 
77 Id. at 289. 
78 WILLIAM B. SANDERS, DETECTIVE WORK 95 (1977). 
79 Id. These findings are also in line with a more rational model of police enforcement, and police 
officers in both examples may well be engaging in efficient allocation of limited resources across 
crimes. The qualitative studies, see supra notes 75–78, however, suggest that police perceptions of the 
inherent severity of such crimes has changed as well. 
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detectives, not just any killing, but only some killings, are seen as 
serious.”80 
Increased exposure to criminal behavior over time may have a similar 
impact. Multiple studies have found that junior prosecutors tend to be 
harsher and more adversarial than their more seasoned colleagues, exposed 
to more frequent and more serious criminal cases. Junior prosecutors are 
more likely to insist on sticking with the most serious charge during plea 
negotiations and to offer harsher sentences.81 Experienced prosecutors, on 
the other hand, view as routine circumstances that younger prosecutors 
initially view as outrageous and offer more favorable plea bargains as a 
result.82 Prosecutors themselves describe in interviews how they soften over 
time especially as they move to prosecute more serious felonies.83 
Across different agencies that encounter different populations of 
offenders, similar differences appeared. Juvenile delinquents who were 
identified by social welfare agencies as serious delinquents, for example, 
were often regarded as “essentially ‘good kids’” by the juvenile court and 
parole boards that encountered much graver cases.84 By routinely 
encountering a wide range of youthful misconduct, court personnel “have a 
higher tolerance of ‘delinquency.’”85 
Such different perceptions of offenders have also led to divergence 
between courts and parole boards. When courts in the 1960s sentenced the 
first marijuana offenders to imprisonment, judges viewed the required 
sentences as extremely harsh and recommended that offenders be released 
after the minimum sentence was served.86 The parole board in California, 
however, was dealing with a population of offenders mostly serving much 
longer sentences of at least thirty months.87 Compared to the general prison 
population, the lower sentences imposed in marijuana cases seemed too 
80 Emerson, supra note 75, at 434–35. 
81 Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, The Cure for Young Prosecutors’ Syndrome, 56 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1065, 1087–88, 1107–08 (2014). 
82 MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND 
DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 98–99 (1978). 
83 Wright & Levine, supra note 81, at 1107–08 (providing a long list of quotes from interviews 
with prosecutors); see also HEUMANN, supra note 82, at 99; Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, 
Cognitive Bias, and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 183, 190 (2007). 
84 Emerson, supra note 75, at 431–32. 
85 ROBERT M. EMERSON, JUDGING DELINQUENTS 84 (1969). 
86 Caleb Foote, Annual Chief Justice Earl Warren Conference on Advocacy in the U.S., The 
Sentencing Function, in A PROGRAM FOR PRISON REFORM 17, 29 (1972). 
87 Id. at 29. 
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lenient to warrant early release, not only after the minimum sentence of 
usually six to twelve months was served but even after eighteen months.88 
Notice that the diverging perspectives of the court and the parole 
board on sentences were driven by the difference in the dimensions that 
serve for the comparison across cases. Courts compare offenders based on 
behaviors or crimes in order to make sentencing decisions. Parole boards, it 
seems, compare offenders based on the length of sentence served when 
making release decisions. What is remarkable is how this led to 
increasingly punitive responses as each determination in the chain of 
criminal justice was made relative to a different contextual background. 
These findings are qualitative and cannot isolate a particular causal 
effect from the other local and organizational environments agencies 
operate in. But the cumulative body of research suggests a pattern that is in 
line with the psychological theory. It demonstrates how each agency 
always has some crimes viewed as the most severe or the most trivial as 
defined in relation to its entire caseload.89 
c. Evidence from a natural experiment.—Do judges’ caseloads
play a similar role in sentencing decisions? Taken together, the 
experimental findings and the qualitative field evidence suggest that they 
could. Yet not everyone will be willing to allow each line of research to 
compensate for the limitations of the other. The experimental settings allow 
for a causal inference, but they are limited to the lab and to measuring 
short-term effects, and they mostly rely on lay subjects. The field studies 
look at real cases but can only provide evidence of observed trends, not of 
their causes, and their focus is nonjudicial bodies. 
Empirically testing for relative judgments in actual judicial decisions 
is technically complicated, and I, therefore, devoted a separate Article to 
developing the empirical methodology and reporting the findings.90 In sum, 
the difficulty stems from the fact that a simple comparison across judges 
sitting in different courts or handling different dockets does not suffice. 
When judges have different caseloads, one cannot tell, for example, 
whether the differences observed in sentencing patterns are evidence of 
judges treating different cases differently or of judges treating similar cases 
differently. Another concern is that judges might be elected or appointed to 
different courts based on some prior underlying characteristics or 
propensities to punish, potentially creating reverse causation. More 
broadly, the communities across different courthouses can differ in many 
88 Id. 
89 Emerson, supra note 75, at 428. 
90 Leibovitch, supra note 10. 
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ways: there might be differences in the methods for processing cases, in 
prosecutorial policies, in local norms, and so on. Such confounding factors 
restrict the ability to infer that any differences observed are causally linked 
to caseload exposure among all other factors.91 
To circumvent these difficulties, I developed an identification strategy 
to measure exogenous variation of a judge’s exposure to criminal gravity. 
The methodology builds on a natural experiment enabled by the fact that 
cases are randomly distributed. Under random assignment, judicial 
caseloads should be balanced on average only when they contain a large-
enough number of cases. But in the short term, with small numbers, we can 
observe a wider distribution of caseload compositions across judges. 
Tracking caseload composition over time, therefore, allows one to identify 
judges who randomly began with unbalanced caseloads before they 
balanced out in the long term and to compare their sentencing outcomes 
only during the period for which their caseloads are balanced.92 
With this insight at hand, I created a matched sample of newly elected 
judges from the Pennsylvania Courts of Common Pleas.93 In Pennsylvania, 
each offense is assigned by statute an offense gravity score (ranging from 
one to fourteen) that is used as a measure of offense severity to calculate 
the recommended sentencing range under the state sentencing guidelines.94 
I used the offense gravity score as an exogenous measure for case gravity, 
and for each judge I calculated the cumulative gravity exposure through 
caseloads for each day on the bench. Each pair in the matched sample 
included two judges who started hearing criminal cases in the same year 
and in the same district. In each pair, one judge randomly drew harsher 
cases during her first months on the bench and the other randomly drew 
milder cases. On average across the different matches, it took 
approximately three months until the initial differences decreased and 
judicial caseloads were balanced with similar exposure to criminal gravity. 
I then compared how the different initial exposure affected judges’ 
sentencing decisions during the following period when their caseloads were 
similar, i.e., the “comparison period.”95 
I verified that during the comparison period, judicial caseloads were 
balanced with regard to a long list of case characteristics: the caseloads of 
the two groups contained cases with similar average offense gravity score, 
defendant prior record score, and mandatory minimum sentences; a similar 
91 Id. at 284–85. 
92 Id. at 293–95. 
93 Id. at 295–99. 
94 204 PA. CODE § 303.15 (2015). 
95 Leibovitch, supra note 10, at 295–300. 
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gender and racial representation; and a similar proportion of cases going to 
trial.96 I also tested for the individual characteristics of judges in the “high” 
and “low” gravity-exposure groups: both groups had the same proportion 
of judges with prior experience as prosecutors or defense attorneys, similar 
gender representation, and similar representations of political affiliations.97 
The two groups, in other words, had overall similar judges deciding 
randomly assigned similar cases. But sentences across the two groups 
widely differed depending on the caseloads encountered during the earlier 
period. 
The results demonstrated the relativism in judges’ sentencing 
decisions. The short-term impact on judicial sentencing patterns was 
substantial. Judges with initial exposure to low-gravity caseloads imposed 
sentences that were on average two months longer than those of judges 
initially exposed to more serious caseloads.98 This represents a 25% 
increase relative to the average sentence (eight months) in the sample.99 
Judges who initially had caseloads of milder gravity were also significantly 
more likely either to sentence a defendant in the aggravated sentencing 
range or to depart above the guidelines’ recommendations.100 Although 
these effects decreased as judges were exposed to additional cases, it took 
approximately six months for the differences in sentencing practices to 
completely decay.101 
These findings demonstrate that judges too are susceptible to relative 
judgments. The setting of the natural experiment focused on judges sitting 
in the same court who over time saw similar dockets, in order to isolate the 
causal effect of caseload exposure on sentencing outcomes. In many 
courthouses, however, differences across judicial docket compositions are 
systematic and persistent. When differences in judicial exposure to gravity 
are the result of a systematic diversion in the assignment of cases to judges 
and are not corrected over time, the resulting differences in the evaluation 
of criminal cases may persist and pose a greater concern for sentencing 
disparities in the justice system. The next Part offers such examples. 
96 Id. at 301. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 304–07. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 306, 308–13. Judges with initially milder caseloads were 1.8 percentage points more 
likely to depart above the sentencing guidelines recommendations and 6.4 percentage points more likely 
to sentence a defendant either above the guidelines or in the aggravated sentencing range. Id. 
101 Id. at 315–16. 
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II. JUDICIAL DOCKETS AND PUNISHMENT CURVES
A. The Caseload Effect
Judicial caseloads provide the context against which particular cases 
are evaluated. This caseload effect can change the substance of judicial 
decisions because of two cognitive processes: extracting similarities and 
relative comparison.102 
Assessing similarities is a crucial part of legal decisions from the 
initial evaluation of offense severity to the detailed investigation into the 
existence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances. In criminal law, 
offenses cluster with different levels of generality. Dimensions of similarity 
can divide offenses according to their severity—for example, an infraction, 
a misdemeanor, or a felony. They can divide cases based on the type of 
offense—such as those involving drugs, property, or violence. They can be 
employed more granularly within a category of cases—to distinguish 
among, for example, drug cases involving marijuana, amphetamines, or 
cocaine. And they are demonstrated in clustering around aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances, as well as in the weight granted in the sentencing 
decision to personal circumstances or circumstances of the offenses. 
The contours of cases in a judge’s caseload affect which comparisons 
will be drawn. When caseloads are more heterogeneous, general 
distinctions will be most salient: between misdemeanors and felonies, for 
example, or violent and nonviolent crimes. The more homogenous 
caseloads become, the less relevant those general dimensions are. For a 
judge who only hears misdemeanors—or only drug cases or only cases 
involving juvenile offenders—such dimensions across categories lose their 
diagnostic value. Judgments of relative severity can be more directly 
affected by an evaluation of the case’s severity relative to the other cases 
before the judge. The same case will be evaluated as relatively worse 
compared to more serious cases and as relatively less serious compared to 
more egregious crimes. The same defendant will be regarded as less 
culpable compared to recidivist felons but as a more serious criminal 
compared to first-time offenders. 
The important question is: How representative are judicial caseloads 
of the universe of relevant criminal conduct? If caseloads are fairly 
representative, the relative severity of a case in the caseload—its location 
on the individual judge’s punishment curve—will roughly correspond to its 
absolute severity. But judicial caseloads are often not representative.103 
102 See supra Section I.B.1. 
103 See infra Section II.B. 
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When the sentencing decision in a particular case is affected by the cases 
previously encountered—perhaps on the same day or several days before—
relative judgments inject arbitrariness into sentencing. When the effect is 
driven by the overall composition of cases in the judge’s docket, this can 
also introduce a systematic bias. 
B. Limited Jurisdiction, Limited Perspectives
The idea that courts of limited jurisdiction are better tailored to serve 
particular policy goals has shaped the movement toward increased 
specialization of courts in recent decades.104 At the same time, because of 
their focus on nonrepresentative caseloads, courts of limited jurisdiction are 
an institutional design that can unintentionally and systematically bias the 
punishment curve. 
This Section discusses three categories that distinguish the various 
court structures currently in place across the United States: (1) unified and 
two-tiered courts for the assignment of misdemeanor and felony cases, (2) 
specialized courts focused on a particular type of offense (e.g., drug courts) 
or offender (e.g., juvenile or veteran courts), and (3) local courts focused 
on a particular geographic area because courts in different localities often 
encounter different crime levels. 
What is common to these three categories of limited jurisdiction is 
that the cases in the jurisdiction of a court (or in the caseload of a judge) 
are more homogenous than the full spectrum of cases encountered by a 
judge in a generalist court. The added similarity makes dimensions that 
would otherwise distinguish these cases from other (unobserved) cases less 
salient and, therefore, distorts the comparison between the observed and 
unobserved cases leading to displacement of the punishment scale for the 
observed cases.105 In all three structures, the evidence provides support for 
relative judgments as a model for judicial decisionmaking. 
1. Unified and Two-Tiered Courts.—Some states use a two-tiered
model of criminal jurisdiction in which a lower level court hears 
misdemeanor cases and a higher court sits in felony cases;106 other states 
have a unified court system in which one court has general jurisdiction over 
104 See generally BAUM, supra note 1 (reviewing the history, policy aims, and varied 
implementation of specialized courts in the United States). 
105 See supra Section I.B. 
106 States in which there are two-tiered courts include, for example, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Michigan, New York, Ohio, and Virginia. For court structure charts of all U.S. states, see COURT 
STATISTICS PROJECT, supra note 19. 
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all criminal offenses.107 States may also change, at times, the court models 
they implement, usually for efficiency reasons.108 
In practice, even in states with a unified court system, the allocation of 
cases across particular judges of the court may nevertheless result in some 
judges having caseloads that are mostly misdemeanors, mostly felonies, or 
a mix.109 For decisions about docket assignments, “the most meaningful 
level is the county or other unit of trial-court jurisdiction rather than the 
state.”110 Exact statistics are hard to come by, but from a survey of judges 
on courts of general jurisdiction conducted in 1977, 16% were actually 
serving in specialized courtrooms, and in 2011 Baum observed that “that 
level almost surely is higher today.”111 Presiding judges can be especially 
influential in metropolises where both caseload pressure and the number of 
available judges are large.112 
The structuring of such court divisions is often based on 
administrative reasons—to save operating costs,113 to address backlogs in 
107 States characterized by unified criminal court systems include, for example, Alabama, 
California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, Tennessee, 
and Wisconsin. Id. 
108 In 1998, California changed the entire structure of its state court system from a two-tiered to a 
unified model in an effort to save on operating costs. CAL. ATT’Y GEN., PROPOSITION 220: COURTS. 
SUPERIOR AND MUNICIPAL COURT CONSOLIDATION (1998) http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/
1998/220_06_1998.htm [https://perma.cc/4FJV-8WB6]. In 2004, the criminal court (previously hearing 
only misdemeanors) and the supreme court (previously hearing only felonies) in the Bronx, NY, were 
merged to become a single supreme court hearing misdemeanor and felony cases together, with the 
hope of expediting the disposition of the large backlog of misdemeanors that accumulated in the 
criminal court. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22 § 42.1 (2004). In 2012, in light of the creation of 
large felony backlogs, the Bronx courts reverted to the two-tiered model. COMM. ON CRIM. COURTS & 
COMM. ON CRIM. JUST. OPERATIONS, N.Y.C. BAR, REPORT ON THE MERGER OF THE BRONX SUPREME 
AND CRIMINAL COURTS (2009), http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/20071735Merger_
BronxSupreme_CriminalCourts.pdf [https://perma.cc/X99Y-VXJX]; LAWERENCE K. MARKS ET AL., 
BRONX MERGER STUDY GRP., THE BRONX CRIMINAL DIVISION: MERGER AFTER FIVE YEARS (2009), 
https://www.nycourts.gov/publications /pdfs/BronxReport11-09.pdf [https://perma.cc/SJ7V-9P29]. 
109 Illinois, for example, has the second-largest unified court system in the United States. Yet my 
visits to the courts revealed how the division of felony and misdemeanor cases (as well as other forms 
of specialized dockets) varies considerably across courts. Even within Cook County, at the first 
municipal district (the City of Chicago), new judges are assigned solely to the misdemeanor docket and 
more senior judges to the felony docket. At the second municipal district (Skokie), the presiding judge 
assigns some judges only to misdemeanors, some judges to misdemeanors together with another 
specialization (usually either traffic or domestic violence cases), and some judges to both misdemeanor 
and felony cases. 
110 BAUM, supra note 1, at 21 (depicting the great differences between state courts’ organizational 
charts and their operation in practice). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 The unification of California state courts, for example, was meant to save operating costs by 
merging the misdemeanor and felony courts into one building with joint staff. CAL. ATT’Y GEN., supra 
note 108. 
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the processing of certain offenses,114 or to create promotion tracks for 
judges within the judicial system.115 The division of misdemeanor and 
felony cases, however, can affect not only the processing of cases but the 
evaluation and substantive outcomes of cases as well. The case distribution 
observed by a misdemeanor judge, for example, is capped by the worst 
case charged as a misdemeanor, and it contains no representation of any 
harsher cases charged as felonies. This can pose a problem for the 
misdemeanor judge in evaluating the relation between the misdemeanors 
she observes and all other cases, and it may displace the sentencing scale 
by making such cases look worse than they otherwise would. 
My own qualitative research at the courts of Cook County, Illinois, 
revealed that this is what happened in 2010 with domestic violence 
offenses in Chicago. Cook County, Illinois, is the second largest unified 
court system in the United States. The name “unified,” however, as 
previously mentioned, rarely describes only one unified court. In fact, the 
City of Chicago has historically maintained one of the most specialized 
judicial systems in the country.116 
Over the last decade, courts in Cook County gradually implemented 
specialized divisions for domestic violence cases. The first domestic 
violence division was established in October 2005 in the first municipal 
district—the City of Chicago.117 The domestic violence division sits at a 
separate location from the criminal court, and ten judges are assigned 
solely to that division.118 At the start of 2010, only the first municipal 
district had such a specialized division,119 and its jurisdiction included all 
114 The Bronx courts were merged to overcome the large misdemeanor backlogs by having felony 
judges assist with hearing misdemeanor cases, and those courts demerged when felony backlogs were 
instead created. N.Y.C. BAR, supra note 108; MARKS ET AL., supra note 108. 
115 In Chicago, my conversations with judges revealed that the assignment of judges to 
misdemeanor or felony dockets is used to create internal “promotion tracks” within the unified court 
system. See supra note 109. 
116 See generally BAUM, supra note 1, ch. 4; ALBERT LEPAWSKY, THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF
METROPOLITAN CHICAGO (1932); MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS (2003); Harley, supra note 
13, at 9–14. 
117 Press Release, Circuit Court of Cook Cty., Chief Judge Evans Announces Circuit Court of Cook 
County Committee on Domestic Violence Court (Aug. 21, 2008), http://www.cookcountycourt.org/
MEDIA/ViewPressRelease/tabid/338/ArticleId/487/Chief-Judge-Evans-announces-Circuit-Court-of-
Cook-County-Committee-on-Domestic-Violence-Court.aspx [https://perma.cc/VG7N-HZ2R]. 
118 LESLIE LANDIS, CITY OF CHI. MAYOR’S OFFICE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ASSESSMENT OF THE 
CURRENT RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CHICAGO 129 (2007). 
119 Domestic violence courtrooms were later established at the fourth (Maywood) and fifth 
(Bridgeview) municipal districts in late September 2010, at the third municipal district (Rolling 
Meadows) in December 2010, and at the second (Skokie) and sixth (Markham) municipal districts in 
2011. However, unlike the Chicago division, some suburban domestic violence courtrooms encompass 
one or two judges assigned to the domestic violence docket while still sitting in the district courthouse 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1230 
domestic violence misdemeanors.120 Felony domestic violence offenses 
remained under the jurisdiction of the felony trial division in the criminal 
court. 
In January 2010, Illinois amended its domestic violence laws to 
increase punishment for domestic violence recidivists by permitting 
prosecutors to treat domestic battery as a Class-4 felony instead of a Class-
A misdemeanor for those with a prior record.121 Because, at that time, the 
domestic violence division in Chicago had jurisdiction over only 
misdemeanor domestic violence cases, recidivist domestic violence 
offenders who were charged with felonies had their cases heard in the 
criminal court. Incredibly, following the amendment, the felony charges in 
the criminal court received shorter sentences than those that would have 
been ordered for the same offense if charged as a misdemeanor in the 
domestic violence division.122 
Despite the intended purpose of the amendment, prosecutors’ requests 
for harsher punishments did not succeed in increasing sentencing levels in 
the criminal court. The court administration in Chicago held “stakeholders 
meetings” that included the presiding judges, court administrators, 
prosecutors, public defenders, and representatives from community 
organizations dealing with domestic violence; all were aware of the 
problem, and yet the sentencing differentials persisted.123 A year later, the 
problem was solved with an institutional change: jurisdiction for Class-4 
felonies was transferred from the criminal court to the domestic violence 
division.124 When additional domestic violence courtrooms were 
established in late 2010 and 2011, their jurisdiction included, by design, 
Class-4 felonies as well.125 
and sometimes assigned additional dockets as well. See Press Release, Circuit Court of Cook Cty., 
Court’s New Domestic Violence Division Expands to Two Suburban Districts (Oct. 28, 2010), 
http://www.cookcountycourt.org/MEDIA/ViewPressRelease/tabid/338/ArticleId/459/Courts-new-
Domestic-Violence-Division-expands-to-two-suburban-districts.aspx [https://perma.cc/B6DN-HP4G]. 
120 LANDIS, supra note 118, at 129. 
121 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-3.2(b) (2012). 
122 Based on the author’s conversations with judges, court administrators, prosecutors, defense 
attorneys, and members of community organizations dealing with domestic violence in the Chicago 
area. 
123 Id. This awareness led to a change in the jurisdiction of the Chicago domestic violence division, 
infra note 124, and to the different design of the jurisdiction of future domestic violence courts, Circuit 
Court of Cook Cty., supra note 119. 
124 CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK CTY., GENERAL ORDER NOS. 1.2, 2.1(g) (2014); see also Circuit 
Court of Cook Cty., supra note 119. 
125 Circuit Court of Cook Cty., supra note 119. 
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2. Specialized Courts.—In addition to the misdemeanor–felony
distinction, the proliferation of specialization in courts over the last decades 
has led to increased use of separate divisions focused on certain categories 
of offenses or offenders.126 Specialized courts often aim to offer separate 
treatment for identified populations—to emphasize the rehabilitation and 
social integration of less culpable offenders (as in juvenile or drug courts)127 
or to offer enhanced protection to more fragile victims (as in domestic 
violence or elderly courts).128 In the last decade, we have witnessed a 
movement calling to extend the use of specialized courts to a growing list 
of offenders such as veterans129 and, more recently, “young adults.”130 
Specialized courts can achieve their unique policy goals through a 
myriad of alternative procedures,131 dispositions,132 penalties,133 and physical 
126 See generally BAUM, supra note 1. 
127 Juvenile courts are discussed in detail in this Section. For drug and treatment-oriented courts, 
see infra Section II.C.3. 
128 For a discussion of domestic violence courts—which in some jurisdictions, such as Chicago, are 
combined with the elderly court—see infra notes 200–06 and accompanying text. 
129 See, e.g., Hawkins, supra note 19, at 565–67, 569; William H. McMichael, The Battle on the 
Home Front: Special Courts Turn to Those Who Served to Help Troubled Vets Regain Discipline, 
Camaraderie, 97 A.B.A. J. 42 (2011). 
130 Recent voices have called to either extend the juvenile courts’ jurisdiction to include “young 
adults” between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four or to establish separate courts for them. See, e.g., 
ROLF LOEBER ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, FROM JUVENILE DELINQUENCY TO YOUNG ADULT 
OFFENDING 20–21 (2013); VINCENT SCHIRALDI ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, COMMUNITY-BASED 
RESPONSES TO JUSTICE-INVOLVED YOUNG ADULTS 2–3, 10 (2015). 
131 In integrated domestic violence courts—such as those implemented in New York, Florida, and 
Oklahoma—the courts’ focus extends beyond just criminal cases, with one judge handling all criminal 
domestic violence cases and related family issues such as custody, visitation, civil-protection orders, 
and matrimonial actions. LABRIOLA ET AL., A NATIONAL PORTRAIT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURTS 5 
(2009). For different models of implementation of integrated domestic violence courtrooms, see, for 
example, Integrated Domestic Violence Courts, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., 
https://www.nycourts.gov/ip/domesticviolence/ [https://perma.cc/KL4D-RDF7]; Integrated Domestic 
Violence Court, TULSA CTY. DIST. COURT, http://www.tulsacountydistrictcourt.org/
accountability_courts.html [https://perma.cc/XA43-TGNH]. Other domestic violence courts, as well as 
some sex-offender courts, rely on extensive monitoring of defendants for prolonged periods. Allegra M. 
McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting Criminal Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 
1587, 1621 (2012). Therapeutic mental-health or drug courts implement less adversarial procedures 
where “the specialized criminal court judge . . . engages in a direct, emotional, and frequently effusive 
manner with defendants, who are often referred to as the courts’ ‘clients.’” Id. at 1613. 
132 Proceedings at juvenile courts, for example, are usually sealed or expunged so that juveniles do 
not face the burden of a criminal record later on. INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., JUVENILE JUSTICE 
STANDARDS, Part XVII (1979). In drug courts, the charges against the defendant are stayed while in the 
program and can be dismissed upon successful completion of treatment, while failure to complete the 
program results in initiation of traditional criminal sanctions (either decided at that stage or based on a 
pre-entered deferred plea bargain). NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 19, at 17. 
133 Problem-solving or treatment-oriented courts⎯including drug courts, mental-health courts, and 
veterans’ courts⎯emphasize rehabilitative alternatives in lieu of incarceration. McLeod, supra note 
131, at 1590–91. They can also implement escalated intermediate sanctions in response to offender 
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and professional resources134—all assisting the courts to serve successfully 
the unique populations they target. Such specialization also enables judicial 
training and expertise where such are required for the appropriate treatment 
of identified populations or subtypes of cases. 
But there is also evidence of unintended consequences—where courts 
that were meant to emphasize treatment and rehabilitation have actually 
developed more punitive sentencing practices. Especially for low-level 
offenses, the evidence reflects how generalist courts are sometimes more 
lenient than specialized courts exposed only to a bounded scope of severity. 
That was the story of the history of the juvenile courts. The 
Progressive Era juvenile courts were established with an eye toward 
rehabilitation of adolescents, viewed as lesser offenders usually with no 
prior criminal record.135 Yet already by the mid-twentieth century, although 
created with goals of rehabilitation and treatment, in practice many such 
courts took a punitive approach and “turned out to be a bad bargain for 
juvenile defendants.”136 
Juvenile courts traditionally did not sentence defendants to time in jail 
or prison but rather to time at a juvenile facility.137 Usually the fact that 
defendants cannot stay in such institutions past the age of twenty-one 
capped the length of the sentence; the court imposed indeterminate terms, 
while the agencies to which the child was committed had discretion over 
how much of the sentence was actually served.138 
Viewing the sentence imposed by juvenile courts as completely 
incomparable to incarceration,139 however, has led to the chasm between the 
punishments of juvenile and adult defendants. In the landmark case In re 
relapse or offer rewards for progress. NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 19, at 18. 
Some juvenile courts implement separate sentencing schedules that are more lenient than the sentencing 
guidelines used for adults. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.0357 (2016). In other states, juvenile 
courts still rely on indeterminate sentencing regimes—where the agency to which the juvenile is 
committed later determines when the juvenile is rehabilitated and how much of the sentence is served. 
E.g., CONN. GEN STAT § 46b-141 (2012); IDAHO CODE § 20-520(1)(r) (2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-
1-137(a)(1)(A) (2010). In many states, such indeterminate commitment of juveniles is also limited to a
maximum period of no more than two years, and a new hearing is required to determine whether
additional commitment periods are necessary. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-36(2) (2011) (twelve
months); CONN. GEN STAT § 46b-141 (2012) (eighteen months); ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.120(b)(1)
(2008) (two years); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-607 (2014) (two years).
134 See infra Section III.B. 
135 BAUM, supra note 1, at 106–08. 
136 Id. at 109. 
137 SAMUEL M. DAVIS ET AL., CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 1278 (5th ed. 2014). 
138 Id. at 1278, 1286. 
139 See, e.g., In re Eric J., 601 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1979); In re Aline D., 536 P.2d 65, 70 (Cal. 1975); In 
re J.L.P., 25 Cal. App. 3d 86, 89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972). 
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Gault, a fifteen-year-old boy was sentenced to a maximum of six years at a 
juvenile facility for the offense of making lewd phone calls to his 
neighbor.140 By contrast, for adults the statutory maximum penalty for such 
an offense was a $50 fine or two months in jail.141 As the Supreme Court 
noted, “It is of no constitutional consequence—and of limited practical 
meaning—that the institution to which [the juvenile] is committed is called 
an Industrial School . . . . [H]owever euphemistic the title . . . an ‘industrial 
school’ for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child is 
incarcerated.”142 The historical shift toward implementing constitutional 
due process protections for juveniles143 was similarly fueled by the 
recognition that, despite its rehabilitative and disciplining roots, “the 
modern juvenile court—with its emphasis on accountability and ‘just 
desert’ sentencing—would be unrecognizable to the late-19th-century 
proponents of the juvenile court model.”144 
140 387 U.S. 1, 7 (1967). This was not as unusual a sentence as one might think. In the case of In re 
Winship, a twelve-year-old child convicted of stealing $112 from a woman’s purse in a locker was 
sentenced to “training school” for a minimum of 18 months and “subject to annual extensions of his 
commitment until his 18th birthday—six years in appellant’s case.” 397 U.S. 358, 360 (1970). 
141 Gault, 387 U.S. at 8–9. 
142 Id. at 27. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, Justice William Douglas in dissent compared the 
Pennsylvania correctional institution for juveniles—”a brick building with barred windows, locked steel 
doors, a cyclone fence topped with barbed wire, and guard towers”—to “a maximum security prison for 
adjudged delinquents.” 403 U.S. 528, 560 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Bethea, 
257 A.2d 368, 369 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1969)); see also Barry C. Feld, The Punitive Juvenile Court and the 
Quality of Procedural Justice: Disjunctions Between Rhetoric and Reality, 36 CRIME & DELINQ. 443, 
453–54 (1990) (reviewing studies of juvenile correctional facilities across different states and multiple 
lawsuits challenging the conditions of confinement and concluding that during the 1970s “the daily 
reality of juveniles confined in many ‘treatment’ facilities is one of staff and inmate violence, predatory 
behavior, and punitive, custodial incarceration”). But see Martin Forst et al., Youth in Prisons and 
Training Schools: Perceptions and Consequences of the Treatment-Custody Dichotomy, 40 JUV. & 
FAM. CT. J. 1 (1989) (regarding conditions in the 1980s, Forst and others interviewed youth in juvenile 
and adult correctional programs and found that youth at juvenile facilities report greater satisfaction 
with counseling, treatment, and training programs and experience lower victimization rates than youth 
incarcerated at adult prisons). 
143 Historically, juveniles were not awarded the same due process rights that apply to adults at 
criminal courts based on classifying the proceedings as civil, rather than criminal, with the state acting 
as parens patriae to discipline the child. Starting from the 1960s, and following the punitive turn at the 
juvenile courts, the Court has gradually extended criminal procedural safeguards to juveniles as well. 
See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962) (discussing investigation due process and the privilege 
against self-incrimination); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (discussing right to counsel and 
full investigation required for waiver of jurisdiction); Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (discussing notice of charges, 
right to counsel, the rights of confrontation and examination, and the privilege against self-
incrimination); Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (discussing observance of the standard of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (discussing the ban on double jeopardy). 
144 Janet E. Ainsworth, Children and Criminal Procedure, in THE CHILD: AN ENCYCLOPEDIC 
COMPANION 221, 222 (Richard A. Shweder et al. eds., 2009). In Kent, the Court explained: 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1234 
Reflecting the shift from a model of parens patriae to just-deserts 
sentencing, since the late 1970s a practice of waiver of jurisdiction became 
increasingly prevalent—allowing the transfer of juvenile delinquents from 
the juvenile court to an adult criminal court in graver cases to allow for 
harsher sentencing.145 Yet that practice also had its share of unintended 
consequences. From the 1970s to the 1990s, researchers were divided over 
the effectiveness of such transfers especially for less serious offenses. 
Some scholars identified a “leniency gap”: juvenile offenders received 
more severe sentences in adult courts (relative to juvenile courts) when 
they were convicted for serious violent crimes but less severe sentences 
when they were convicted for property crimes.146 Some studies have found 
that juveniles transferred to adult court were more likely to have their cases 
dismissed147 and that juvenile defendants charged as adults with violent 
crimes were more likely than those retained in juvenile court to be released 
pending adjudication.148 Young offenders often also received more lenient 
sentences in criminal court than they would have received in juvenile 
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of juvenile courts, studies and 
critiques in recent years raise serious questions as to whether actual performance measures well 
enough against theoretical purpose to make tolerable the immunity of the process from the reach 
of constitutional guaranties applicable to adults . . . . There is evidence, in fact, that there may be 
grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the 
protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for 
children. 
383 U.S. at 555−56 (footnote omitted). In Breed, the Court reiterated: “[O]ur decisions in recent years 
have recognized that there is a gap between the originally benign conception of the [juvenile court] 
system and its realities.” 421 U.S. at 528. 
145 Fagan, supra note 1, at 243; Forst et al., supra note 142, at 2–3. 
146 See, e.g., Carole Wolff Barnes & Randal S. Franz, Questionably Adult: Determinants and 
Effects of the Juvenile Waiver Decision, 6 JUST. Q. 117, 131 (1989); Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz & 
Barry C. Feld, Judicial Waiver Policy and Practice: Persistence, Seriousness and Race, 14 LAW & 
INEQ. 73, 164 (1995). For a general overview of the literature, see, for example, Fagan, supra note 1, at 
244; Howell, supra note 1. 
147 Marshall Young, Waiver from a Judge’s Standpoint, in MAJOR ISSUES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE
INFORMATION AND TRAINING 309, 313–16 (John C. Hall et al. eds., 1981) (discussing a study by the 
National Center for Juvenile Justice that took advantage of the difference in the age of adulthood 
between New York, where sixteen-year-olds were adjudicated as adults, and Philadelphia, where 
sixteen-year-olds were handled in the juvenile court, and finding that the adult court dismissed 74% of 
the offenders in comparison to only 48% of cases dismissed at the juvenile court); Dean J. Champion, 
Teenage Felons and Waiver Hearings: Some Recent Trends, 1980-1988, 35 CRIME & DELINQ. 577, 584 
(1989) (“[A]ccording to several juvenile court prosecutors, it is likely that many of those juveniles who 
received probation or had their cases dismissed in criminal courts would have been adjudicated as a 
delinquent by juvenile judges and sentenced to secure confinement in one of several secure state 
detention facilities.”). 
148 David L. Myers & Kraig Kiehl, The Predisposition Status of Violent Youthful Offenders: Is 
There a “Custody Gap” in Adult Criminal Court?, 3 JUST. RES. & POL’Y 115 (2001). 
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court,149 especially property offenders when they appeared in criminal court 
as first-time adult offenders.150 This disparity across the courts was 
contradictory to the purpose of transferring juveniles to the adult court. As 
Podkopacz and Feld observed: “It makes no penological sense for juvenile 
court judges to send youths to adult court to receive longer sentences, and 
then to have those criminal court judges impose shorter sentences than 
those meted out in juvenile court.”151 
Relative evaluation of case severity can explain such an anomalous 
outcome if the adolescents in criminal court appear “less severe” in 
comparison to older offenders.152 In addition, sweeping legal reforms in 
many states during the 1980s and 1990s expanded the transfer of juveniles 
to adult courts—especially for violent offenses but also in drug and 
property cases. These reforms excluded many serious offenses from 
juvenile court jurisdiction. Thereafter, as juvenile courts increasingly 
tended to deal with less serious offenses, relative judgments can explain 
why these cases appeared relatively worse. The Office of Juvenile Justice 
and Delinquency Prevention at the U.S. Department of Justice 
acknowledged the competing findings and suggested a similar explanation: 
[I]t is likely that juvenile-criminal sentencing differences are largest in states
that criminally prosecute only the most serious juvenile offenders. In states
with transfer laws that apply to a broader range of less serious offenses, one
would expect the adult system to regard transferred youth more lightly—and
perhaps more lightly than the juvenile system would.153
3. Geographic Jurisdiction.—Another dimension for the assignment
of jurisdiction across courts is geographic jurisdiction. Geographic 
disparities in sentencing were one of the main concerns of the Sentencing 
Commission and a central justification for the adoption of the Sentencing 
149 Martin Roysher & Peter Edelman, Treating Juveniles as Adults in New York: What Does It 
Mean and How Is It Working?, in MAJOR ISSUES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE INFORMATION AND TRAINING, 
supra note 147, at 265, 267 (examining case outcomes following the New York Juvenile Justice Reform 
Act of 1976 and concluding that sanctions at the criminal court were not more severe and often were 
less harsh); Young, supra note 147, at 314 (also reporting that “[t]he [Pittsburgh] juvenile court was 
twice as likely to commit a violent offender to a facility when the offense involved injury to person as 
was the adult court in New York”). 
150 Barnes & Franz, supra note 146, at 133 (In California “[p]roperty offenders with a long history 
of property offenses tend to receive a substantially lighter sentence in adult court than they would have 
received when moving up the ladder in juvenile court.”); Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 146, at 165 (In 
Minnesota “[t]he juvenile court imposed significantly longer sentences on less serious property 
offenders than did adult criminal court. This anomalous disparity between juvenile and criminal court 
sentencing practice perpetuates the ‘punishment gap.’”). 
151 Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 146, at 165. 
152 EMERSON, supra note 85; Fagan, supra note 1, at 239. 
153 OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, supra note 19, at 24. 
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Guidelines. By now, however, there is wide agreement that this battle is 
lost.154 Many factors contribute to the variance in sentencing practices 
across courts, including different norms and needs across local 
communities and the courts that serve them, and they have been the subject 
of intensive study.155 What this Article adds to that discourse is that, 
although not generally thought of in such a way, district courthouses are 
courts of limited geographic jurisdiction: when local caseloads differ, that 
leads to different relative judgments. 
In particular, the division of geographic jurisdiction can be correlated 
with disparate exposure to criminal gravity. Criminologists analyzing the 
differences across local state courts found not only that their sentencing 
practices are different but also that such differences follow a particular 
pattern: judges in large urban counties are more lenient than judges in 
smaller rural or suburban courts.156 Repeated research has demonstrated that 
in larger counties sentences of incarceration are shorter and less frequent.157 
In urban counties, judges are also more likely to sentence defendants below 
the guidelines range.158 Downward departures from sentencing guidelines 
ranges for serious violent offenses are more likely in medium and large 
courts than in small courts.159 And in courts with larger caseloads, 
downward departures from sentencing guidelines are also more likely and 
upward departures are less likely.160 
Criminologists have also documented how different levels of violent 
crime across district courts affect sentencing decisions in particular cases. 
When violent crimes are a smaller portion of a court’s caseload, they are 
treated more seriously.161 As the proportion of violent crime in the court 
154 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal 
Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85, 95, 100–02 (2005) (discussing the empirical findings by the 
Sentencing Commission’s research staff and noting the possible interpretation that “the reported 
increase in geographic disparity swamped the reported reduction in interjudge disparity so that the 
Guidelines were an even bigger bust”); Bowman, Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, supra 
note 17, at 1327 (observing that “interdistrict disparities appear to have grown larger in the guidelines 
era, particularly in drug cases”); Daniel Richman, Federal Sentencing in 2007: The Supreme Court 
Holds—The Center Doesn’t, 117 YALE L.J. 1374, 1380–83 (2008) (suggesting that heterogeneous 
district strategies were in fact celebrated and encouraged by the Department of Justice). 
155 See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 157–60. 
156 See supra note 3; see also infra notes 157–60 and accompanying text. 
157 Ulmer & Johnson, supra note 3. 
158 John H. Kramer & Jeffery T. Ulmer, Sentencing Disparity and Departures from Guidelines, 
13 JUST. Q. 81 (1996); Jeffery T. Ulmer & John H. Kramer, Court Communities Under Sentencing 
Guidelines: Dilemmas of Formal Rationality and Sentencing Disparity, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 383 (1996). 
159 John H. Kramer & Jeffery T. Ulmer, Downward Departures for Serious Violent Offenders: 
Local Court “Corrections” to Pennsylvania’s Sentencing Guidelines, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 897 (2002). 
160 Johnson, supra note 15, at 781–82. 
161 EISENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 271. 
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increases, the likelihood of downward departures for a violent crime 
increases and the likelihood of upward departures decreases.162 
This Article suggests that such trends fit within a larger framework. 
Rural and suburban areas, and areas served by smaller courts, generally 
face lower crime levels than large urban areas.163 Consequently, relative 
evaluations of severity can lead rural judges to judge the same cases more 
harshly than urban judges. 
While there could be good arguments in favor of local courts serving 
their local communities,164 including through adjusting sentencing levels, 
there are also reasons why awareness of such a phenomenon is important, 
and such a trend is not necessarily desirable. Justifying local norms that are 
based on substantive differences in attitudes, beliefs, and pressing needs is 
one thing. But if such norms are, at least to some extent, driven not just by 
social or ideological factors but are also mechanically nudged by caseload 
effects—that is a different rationale that perhaps deserves less weight. 
C. Considerations for Case Assignments
Once the unintended consequences of limited docket composition 
have been acknowledged, the above analysis reveals several factors that 
can particularly exacerbate or attenuate the outcomes of relative judgments 
in the courts. 
1. Scope of Severity in Caseloads.—The evaluation of relative
severity will be particularly biased when a case is evaluated against a 
nonrepresentative sample of criminal severity. The distinction between a 
misdemeanor and a felony, or a violent and a nonviolent crime, is a 
fundamental one for a judge hearing all types of offenses. But for a judge 
who only hears misdemeanor cases or nonviolent cases, such features are 
irrelevant for differentiation—after all, all cases in that court are such.165 
The ranking of a particular case’s severity will also be different when the 
caseload contains no representations of harsher cases.166 The same 
misdemeanor will be ranked relatively low compared to all offenses 
(because all felony cases will be ranked higher), and it will be ranked 
higher compared against only misdemeanor cases. This can pose a problem 
162 Johnson, supra note 15, at 775, 785. 
163 See, e.g., DETIS T. DUHART, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, URBAN,
SUBURBAN, AND RURAL VICTIMIZATION, 1993–98 (2000); ELIZABETH KNEEBONE & STEVEN 
RAPHAEL, BROOKINGS INST., CITY AND SUBURBAN CRIME TRENDS IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 
(2011). 
164 See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text. 
165 See supra Section I.B.1.a. 
166 See supra Section I.B.1.b. 
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for a judge with a bounded scope of gravity in her caseload in evaluating 
the proper relation between the cases she observes and all other cases and 
shift the sentencing scales of judges evaluating only misdemeanors or only 
felonies. 
The severity of cases is perhaps the most recognized and prevalent 
dimension of jurisdictional assignments in the judiciary, relevant to all the 
previously reviewed examples: this is the type of decision underlying the 
structure of unified or two-tiered divisions in state courts,167 as well as the 
restriction of the jurisdiction of specialized courts to misdemeanor or low-
class felonies.168 Offense severity is also a criterion in deciding whether 
offenders are eligible for drug court treatment169 and whether juveniles are 
charged at the juvenile or the adult court.170 This is also the underlying 
problem in the exposure of different local courts to different levels of 
crime.171 Exposure to cases of lower severity can explain all the phenomena 
reviewed in Section II.B above, and it is a serious concern for the current 
structure of court systems. 
If the punishment curve used by the misdemeanor judge is to the right 
of the true distribution and the punishment curve used by the felony judge 
is to the left, then some misdemeanors could be sentenced more harshly 
than felonies. Such outcomes contradict retributive notions of punishment. 
They are also contradictory to maintaining marginal deterrence for crimes 
of increasing severity. They often also undermine the achievement of other 
social goals like getting tougher on domestic violence or emphasizing 
rehabilitation at the drug courts. 
Such a paradoxical effect—where misdemeanors get sentenced more 
harshly than felonies involving similar conduct—is also in tension with the 
lesser procedural safeguards granted to misdemeanor defendants. Many 
procedural entitlements possessed by felony defendants—such as rights to 
a grand jury, to a preliminary hearing, and to increased discovery—are not 
awarded to defendants in misdemeanor cases.172 The reason is that under 
existing law, the application of procedural safeguards rests almost entirely 
on the maximum term of incarceration authorized by the charged offense.173 
167 See supra Section II.B.1. 
168 See supra notes 19, 117–25 and accompanying text. 
169 NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 19, at 22. 
170 See supra notes 19, 145–53 and accompanying text. 
171 See supra Section II.B.3. 
172 Paul T. Crane, Charging on the Margin, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 775, 802–06 (2016). 
173 This distinction between misdemeanor and felony defendants has already faced criticism. Some 
critiques highlight the value of fair process and avoiding wrongful convictions, regardless of how 
“petty” the potential punishment is. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1352 
(2012). Others emphasize the vast legal, economic, and psychological implications of misdemeanor 
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But when jurisdictions implement court structures that lead to 
systematically sentencing some misdemeanors more harshly than felonies, 
the focus on maximal rather than actual punishment is hard to justify. 
Notably, courts of limited jurisdiction usually concentrate on 
categories of less serious offenses and are often restricted to hearing 
misdemeanors or low-class felonies.174 As a result, the overall effect of 
dividing jurisdiction based on offense gravity is also a tendency towards 
increased punitiveness. 
2. Correlation with Relevant Factors for Sentencing.—Even when
caseloads are not assigned directly based on severity, they can affect 
judicial evaluation of relative severity by changing the relative weight of 
certain mitigating and aggravating factors. Most specialized courts are 
constructed around personal characteristics that are widely recognized as, 
and closely associated with, relevant considerations for sentencing. Yet 
once a mitigating or aggravating dimension becomes common to all 
persons before the court, the contrast is reduced between those 
characterized by that feature and those that are not. 
Consequently, the unintended consequences of such specialization 
might be that an otherwise relevant consideration in sentencing loses its 
diagnostic value and becomes irrelevant.175 Being a juvenile, for example, 
can be an important distinguishing factor in the criminal court but 
ironically a lesser one at the juvenile court. The seventeen-year-old 
offender would fair relatively well compared to a recidivist adult offender 
but much worse when evaluated against only younger juveniles. A 
particular veteran’s military service record and mental and economic state 
would make her appear very sympathetic relative to the general population 
of offenders, but these qualities will not be distinguishing factors among 
defendants who are all veterans. 
When the diagnostic value of such features is eliminated, they are less 
likely to be taken into account in the sentencing process. But although they 
do not possess much diagnostic value to distinguish among cases within the 
judges’ caseloads, they are important factors in penal evaluations more 
convictions, id. at 1325–27, including the potential for lengthier incarceration based on the aggregation 
of multiple misdemeanor charges, Colleen P. Murphy, The Narrowing of the Entitlement to Criminal 
Jury Trial, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 133, 157–69, and the increasing attachment of collateral consequences to 
misdemeanor convictions—such as disenfranchisement, deportation, sex-offender registrations, and 
firearm prohibitions—previously reserved only for convicted felons, Crane, supra note 172, at 780–82. 
All, however, remain focused on potential consequences—carceral or collateral—but have not extended 
the critique to a test of the actual practice of punishment in such offenses. 
174 See supra note 19; supra Sections II.B.1−2. 
175 See supra Section I.B.1. 
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generally. Forgoing them can undermine the relative scaling of such cases 
against other cases in the criminal justice system. 
3. Uniqueness of Cases.—When a caseload is more homogenous
than the overall distribution of offenses, it is also important to consider the 
expected magnitude of the punishment curve’s effect. In particular, one 
should consider whether the caseload has the type of cases that already call 
for a separate sentencing scale or whether the cases should be evaluated 
proportionally to other types of cases. 
For most criminal cases, proportionality is relevant across different 
levels and types of crimes, and therefore, nonrepresentative caseloads raise 
the serious concerns of biased sentencing curves discussed above. The 
division of misdemeanor and felony cases across courts, or the 
concentration of all crimes committed by juveniles under one court, are 
such examples. 
Some crimes, however, are unique—they justify a separate sentencing 
scale or they are unlikely to be matched against crimes from other 
categories. For those crimes, the lack of a comparison to other cases might 
be less distortive. Traffic cases, for example, are mostly punishable by 
fines and often viewed as a separate category from the general criminal 
docket. Crimes that carry mostly monetary fines might be harder to scale 
compared to crimes that are punished mainly with imprisonment. 
Another example is when policymakers are concerned that certain 
crimes have unique features whose gravity cannot be properly identified 
when they are immersed in a general criminal caseload, as is argued about 
domestic violence offenses. One might think that domestic violence cases 
are evaluated more accurately when judged separately because the focus 
becomes the abusive domestic environment rather than the physical harm 
itself. If domestic violence cases are unique in a way that justifies a 
separate sentencing curve, then separating them from other cases may be 
benevolent rather than distortive. 
4. Types of Dispositions.—The proliferation of specialization in the
courts has also brought with it an increased movement to establish 
therapeutic and treatment-oriented courts—focused on court-supervised 
treatment programs in lieu of criminal sanctions—and the consequences of 
relative judgments may be different based on the type of disposition 
utilized. In sentencing decisions, the concerns arising from relative 
judgments are most acute because they conflict with the desire for 
proportionality and consistency in sentencing. Rehabilitation, on the other 
hand (at least conceptually), is more tailored to the circumstances of an 
individual defendant. In therapeutic or treatment-oriented courts, the 
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problem of biasing the sentencing curve might be less acute due to those 
courts’ focus on a judge-supervised treatment plan as an alternative to the 
adversarial criminal process—the judge “[a]ct[s] more like a probation 
officer than a jurist.”176 Because the underlying concept for these courts 
“begins with an understanding that routine criminal punishment will not 
address the participant’s underlying problem,”177 by virtue of being 
disinterested in punishments the courts escape the need for proportionality 
in sentencing—and, therefore, the concern of relative judgments as an 
obstacle to proportionality. 
One should be cautious, though: as past experience with drug and 
juvenile courts teaches, it is not always easy to tell whether treatment-
oriented courts are interested only in rehabilitation, and it is sometimes 
unclear how to evaluate case outcomes and their punitiveness. Scholars 
have long warned that “[t]he most serious vice of sanctioning systems that 
were associated with the rehabilitative ideal was their tendency to distort 
the definition of just proportion in punishment.”178 Increased awareness is 
required to avoid the pitfalls of overpunitiveness in the dispositions of such 
courts—like the concerns that guided states in legislating limits on the 
commitment of juveniles179 or that guided the Supreme Court’s extension of 
due process rights to juveniles in the juvenile courts of the mid-twentieth 
century.180 
More generally, relative judgments might be less concerning only if 
such courts truly do not impose punishments. In modern juvenile courts, 
different mechanisms blur the line between juvenile and criminal court 
dispositions. All states implement some, and often several, mechanisms to 
charge juvenile offenders in adult courts181 or to transfer juveniles between 
176 Hawkins, supra note 19, at 568. 
177 Id. at 570. 
178 Franklin E. Zimring, Drug Treatment as a Criminal Sanction, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 809, 813 
(1993); see also, e.g., Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REV. 783, 788 (2008) 
(“[D]rug courts have not—as advertised—abandoned the ‘traditional criminal justice paradigm’ . . . . 
They have merely relocated the old paradigm to the background.”); McLeod, supra note 131, at 1615–
17, 1619 (warning that “cordoning off certain courts as purely involved in therapeutic interventions may 
both misstate what is actually occurring in those courts and undermine judicial self-consciousness about 
whether the punitive effects of particular decisions are proportional to the offending conduct and no 
greater than necessary to deter offending behavior”). 
179 See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 405/5-710(7) (2016); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 898(A)
(2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2513(a)-(b) (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-137(a)(1)(B) (2015). 
180 See supra notes 143–44 and accompanying text. 
181 As of 2009, twenty-nine states offer statutory exclusions for certain offences, filed directly in 
criminal courts, and fifteen states leave the decision whether to charge the defendant in the criminal or 
juvenile court in the hands of the prosecutor. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY 
PREVENTION, supra note 19, at 3–6. In thirty-four states, a juvenile who was sentenced once by a 
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the juvenile and adult courts.182 Many states also have blended sentencing 
laws, allowing both adult and juvenile courts to implement overlapping 
disposition and sentencing options.183 Where the criminal and juvenile 
courts employ a parallel set of sanctions, the question of harmony—or 
proportionality—between cases at the different courts fully resurfaces. 
Similarly, drug courts often carry the threat of criminal sentences as 
the stick alongside the carrot for compliance of avoiding conviction and 
sanctions.184 But that stick does not necessarily need to be implemented by 
the same court that supervises the treatment program. Instead, defendants 
who fail to meet the conditions of their treatment or supervision could be 
transferred back to the general criminal system for sentencing.185 To the 
extent treatment-oriented courts also impose criminal penalties, by 
performing such a function the court is no longer disinterested in 
proportionality. In fact, it might then be especially susceptible to the 
problems of different punishment curves.186 
criminal court remains under adult jurisdiction for future cases regardless of the level or type of later 
offences. Id. 
182 As of 2009, forty-five states have discretionary transfer laws—generally triggered by a 
prosecutorial request but sometimes by the court—under which the juvenile court may transfer the case 
to the criminal court. Id. at 2–5, 7. Twenty-six states also have some form of presumptive or mandatory 
waivers for certain offenses or circumstances. Id. at 2–5, 7. And in twenty-four states, a reversed 
mechanism exists in which the criminal court can transfer cases of young offenders to be heard at the 
juvenile court. Id. at 2–3, 5, 7. 
183 Fourteen states provide juvenile courts with criminal-sentencing options as well (juvenile 
blended sentencing), and eighteen states allow criminal courts to impose juvenile dispositions (criminal 
blended sentencing). Id. at 7. 
184 NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 19, at 18; Bowers, supra note 178, at 
788. 
185 Other proposals by critics of the drug courts similarly aim to disentangle treatment and 
sentencing. Bowers envisions a voluntary opt-in process in which drug addicts can choose when to 
participate and successful treatment would lead to expungement of participants’ past record. Bowers, 
supra note 178, at 832–33. McLeod proposes a shift of focus to emphasize a decarceration model for 
specialized courts leading to de facto decriminalization of certain conducts and enabling an alternative 
noncarceral social approach focused on social services and treatment institutions. McLeod, supra note 
131. This Article does not advocate for any one particular form of reform. It supports the critique by
highlighting the importance from a relative-judgment perspective, of overcoming the amalgamation of
sentencing functions together with exposure to a bounded scope of severity or unrepresentative
population of offenders.
186 There is indeed some evidence of certain drug courts imposing “atypically long prison 
sentences for the very defendants that drug courts were supposed to keep out of prison and off of 
drugs,” Bowers, supra note 178, at 786, “sentences [that] are significantly higher for those who seek 
drug treatment and fail than for those who simply avoid drug treatment and take a plea, at both the 
misdemeanor and felony level,” NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 19, at 29, and 
“unnecessary terms of incarceration for minor or technical violations,” McLeod, supra note 131, at 
1618. 
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The bias introduced by relative judgments, therefore, only can be 
alleviated if the line between treatment-oriented courts and criminal courts 
is carefully drawn. And the concern about its unintended consequences 
needs to be considered in drawing such jurisdictional lines and in deciding 
about the extent to which treatment and sentencing are interconnected. 
When courts operate under a blended model focusing on a population in 
need of treatment—such as those suffering from drug or alcohol abuse, the 
mentally ill, veterans, or juveniles—complete specialization together with 
sentencing functions raises a heightened risk for unintended consequences 
contrary to the court’s mission. 
*  *  *
Because the type of cases under the jurisdiction of courts affects the 
substance of the decisions reached, decisions about divisions in the court 
system are not merely administrative. They entail a decision about 
sentencing levels themselves by nudging the sentencing curve in a 
particular direction. In that sense, the increasing movement towards 
specialization in courts inherently undermines the quest for uniformity in 
sentencing. 
And it undermines it in a particularly disturbing way since the 
sentencing curves that develop are not based on any penological 
considerations. Such biased sentencing clearly undermines notions of 
justice and equal treatment because similarly situated defendants are 
sentenced differently. These sentencing disparities cannot be justified as 
the price we pay for judicial discretion. It is not that sentencing differentials 
reflect differences in judicial ideology because even the same judge might 
order different sentences based on exposure to different cases at the court. 
This is also not about emphasizing individualization in sentencing because 
the decision in a particular case is affected by the characteristics of the 
other cases in a judge’s caseload. Furthermore, because courts of limited 
jurisdiction often concentrate on relatively less serious offenses, 
specialization will often also be associated with increased punitiveness. 
III. LESSONS FOR COURTS OF GENERAL, LIMITED,
AND HYBRID JURISDICTION 
Acknowledging the unintended consequences of limited jurisdiction 
raises the question of how one should approach specialization and 
jurisdictional divisions in the judiciary. If the problem of relative 
judgments is exacerbated when judges face homogenous caseloads—
especially when those caseloads differ from the general distribution of 
crimes—a simple policy prescription is to ensure that judges’ caseloads are 
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representative of the general distribution of crimes. This suggests a 
potential reason to prefer courts of general jurisdiction to courts of a 
limited one. 
Of course, the bias introduced by relative judgments is one cost that 
should still be balanced against the potential benefits of specialization. But 
once it becomes clear that the impact of limited jurisdiction is not merely 
administrative (and outcome neutral) but rather that it has a significant 
substantive cost as well, there needs to be a significant benefit to outweigh 
it—and the need for a particular justification for specialization becomes 
acute. Where specialization is based on administrative or resource 
considerations—not on any benefits of specialization—generalist courts 
may be optimal. If specialization is required for particular benefits (such as 
special training or judicial expertise) or when complete unification is 
impractical (for example, because of geographic barriers), policymakers 
should consider the use of hybrid court models where possible. 
A. Operational Reasons for Limited Jurisdiction
When the reason for separating the treatment of certain cases is 
merely operational, the benefits of using courts of limited jurisdiction are 
not uniquely tied to that particular organizational design and might, 
therefore, push towards preferring courts of general jurisdiction. The 
misdemeanor−felony distinction is one dimension where court structures 
are usually determined based on administrative considerations.187 At the 
same time, the creation of two-tiered dockets can bias sentencing outcomes 
based on the dimension where proportionality is especially acute—the 
severity of the offense. This might, therefore, be an example for where 
courts of general jurisdiction would be better aligned with proportionality 
in sentencing. 
Further, evidence implies that while random assignment of cases is 
superior to nonrandom dockets, even better would be to ensure that 
caseloads are not only random but also balanced with similar exposure to 
cases.188 As judicial caseloads become more representative of the overall 
crime distribution, the punishment curve applied by the judges more 
closely tracks real-world proportionality and the decisions of different 
judges become more coherent.189 Implementing case-assignment systems 
that take into account the current composition of judicial dockets in future 
187 See supra notes 106–15 and accompanying text. 
188 In previous scholarship, I conducted a “placebo” test and found that when judges’ initial 
caseloads contained similar exposure to gravity, the judges’ following sentencing outcomes were 
practically identical. Leibovitch, supra note 10, at 309, 314. 
189 Id. at 309. 
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assignment decisions could equalize judicial exposure and by that the 
background against which judicial decisions are made. 
This is also an area that highlights the importance of devoting 
attention to such jurisdictional decisions at a centralized level. Currently, 
decisions on the unit of specialization are not limited to instituting courts of 
limited jurisdiction. They are also prevalent at the level of creating 
narrower divisions and specialized dockets within courts of general 
jurisdiction.190 This empowers particular judges and administrators to make 
such decisions, often with little regard to the situation in neighboring courts 
or to the potential impact on the substantive outcomes reached by judges. It 
was such an oversight, for example, that led to the failure in Chicago of the 
aforementioned amendment to Illinois domestic violence laws (that enabled 
felony charges against recidivist offenders) because only the Chicago court 
separated between misdemeanor and felony cases.191 When assigned to 
separate divisions, the felonies were sentenced more leniently than the 
misdemeanors.192 Within a given jurisdiction concerned with equitable 
treatment across cases, greater emphasis should be granted to ensure that 
different courthouses within the jurisdiction implement similar case-
assignment rules and to promote centralized decisionmaking at the county 
or state level rather than at the discretion of the presiding judges of 
particular courts. 
The division of geographic jurisdiction is similarly driven not only by 
differences in local knowledge or approaches but to a large extent by 
practical constraints as well. A generalist court serving the entire nation is 
clearly infeasible, and so is one court per state. But at a lower 
administrative level, some narrower jurisdictional divisions perhaps should 
be reconsidered. In large counties, for example, local courts are usually 
divided based on municipal districts. Within the municipal districts, even 
narrower jurisdictions are often established with particular courthouses, or 
judges in a courthouse, focusing on cases of certain cities, towns, or 
villages.193 Wide geographic distances across municipalities can perhaps 
190 See supra notes 109−12 and accompanying text. 
191 See supra notes 117–25 and accompanying text. 
192 See supra notes 121–25 and accompanying text. 
193 The largest county in the United States, Los Angeles County, California, is divided into nine 
county regions and operates twenty-four criminal courthouses. Criminal Courthouses, SUPERIOR 
COURT OF CAL., CTY. OF L.A., http://www.lacourt.org/courthouse/mode/division/criminal 
[https://perma.cc/HB2Y-VUYK]. The second largest county, Cook County, Illinois, has six different 
municipal judicial districts. As a practical matter, the criminal courthouses in suburban judicial districts 
often further divide municipalities across judges. Organization of the Circuit Court, STATE OF ILL., 
CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK CTY., http://www.cookcountycourt.org/ABOUTTHECOURT/
OrganizationoftheCircuitCourt.aspx [https://perma.cc/E7NG-JWFA]. 
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justify some divisions across courts. But when defendants from different 
cities arrive at the same courthouse, dividing municipalities across judges is 
likely less justified. Policymakers could also consider local crime levels to 
design jurisdictions with more similar crime exposure. With prison 
overpopulation already a salient issue in the United States, parole boards 
could take into account possible misalignments in the sentencing of 
offenders across district courthouses within the county or the state in early-
release decisions.194 More generally, any such decisions should also take 
into account the impact of caseload exposure on sentencing levels and 
balance them accordingly—something that is currently not done. 
B. Substantive Reasons for Limited Jurisdiction
Specialization may also be desirable due to special professional 
knowledge, training, or resources that are required for the appropriate 
treatment of identified populations or subtypes of cases. 
Importantly, what I term “substantive reasons” here are 
distinguishable from a mere desire to affect sentencing levels. Sentencing 
levels can be addressed in an array of ways—from separate sentencing 
schedules to acknowledging certain circumstances as mitigating and 
aggravating factors to legislated mandatory minimum or statutory 
maximum sentences.195 Assigning cases to a separate court is not necessary 
to implement such penal goals.196 And because of the bias introduced by 
194 This is especially relevant because the local districts developing different punishment levels are 
not the ones internalizing the costs associated with such sentences, and the cost of imprisonment is born 
at the state (for state prisons) or county (for county jails) level. 
195 Washington, for example, implements separate sentencing schedules for juveniles. WASH. REV.
CODE § 13.40.0357 (2016). Illinois made a prior record an aggravating circumstance in domestic 
violence sentences—enabling it to charge recidivist offenders with felonies instead of misdemeanors. 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-3.2 (2012). 
196 Indeed, this distinction lies at the heart of the famous debate between abolitionists and 
nonabolitionists of the juvenile courts. Scholars calling for the abolition of the juvenile courts 
emphasize that: “If shorter sentences for reduced culpability is the principal justification for juvenile 
courts, then providing youths with fractional reductions of adult sentences could just as readily meet 
that goal.” Feld, supra note 142, at 461; see also, e.g., Katherine Hunt Federle, The Abolition of the 
Juvenile Court: A Proposal for the Preservation of Children’s Legal Rights, 16 J. CONTEMP. L. 23, 50 
(1990); Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 724 (1991). 
The opposition to abolition of the juvenile courts, on the other hand, focuses on the importance of the 
courts’ procedures for social goals beyond sentencing: “[T]he juvenile courts do afford benefits that are 
unlikely to be replicated in the criminal courts, such as the institutionalized intake diversionary system, 
anonymity, diminished stigma, shorter sentences, and recognition of rehabilitation as a viable goal.” 
Irene Merker Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the Juvenile Court Abolitionists, 
1993 WIS. L. REV. 163, 184–85 (footnotes omitted); see also, e.g., Daniel M. Filler & Austin E. Smith, 
The New Rehabilitation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 951 (2006); Ira M. Schwartz et al., Nine Lives and Then 
Some: Why the Juvenile Court Does Not Roll Over and Die, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 533, 550–51 
(1998). 
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exposure to a bounded scope of cases, it can actually undermine them. In 
courts that are meant to exercise leniency in sentencing, concentrating on 
only low-level offenses or more sympathetic offenders can lessen the 
contrast between them and more serious criminals and lead to unintended 
punitiveness.197 When divisions are instituted to get “tough on crime,” a 
biased sentencing curve means either too lenient sentences for very serious 
offenses198 or exceedingly harsh sentences even beyond what is socially 
desired.199 Either way, penal goals are better addressed through legislative 
and policy measures not through courts of limited jurisdiction. 
Many specialized courts, however, do not merely punish differently; 
they also treat and rehabilitate, protect victims, and promote other social 
goals. Juvenile, veterans, and mental-health courts are meant to emphasize 
the rehabilitation and social integration of unique populations of 
offenders—and they can implement less adversarial procedures in order to 
do so. Domestic violence or elderly courts focus on especially fragile 
victims who are often the subjects of ongoing, not just past, victimization 
and, therefore, in need of protection beyond the adjudicative process itself. 
Judges in such courts often receive special training to better understand and 
197 See, e.g., supra Section II.B.2 (discussing juvenile courts). 
198 For instance, scholars have criticized international criminal tribunals addressing mass atrocities 
for issuing sentences which are lenient both generally and when specifically compared to sentences 
ordered for murder, torture, and rape in domestic courts. Such comparisons are not confined to the U.S. 
but also incorporate sentencing practices in Canada and various countries in South America, Europe, 
Asia, and Africa. See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, A Sentence-Based Theory of Complementarity, 53 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 85, 118 (2012) (comparing the sentences of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Special Panels for Serious 
Crimes in East Timor to those of domestic courts in twenty-two countries and finding “international 
sentences . . . excessively lenient”); Jens David Ohlin, Towards a Unique Theory of International 
Sentencing, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 373 (Göran Sluiter & Sergey Vasiliev eds., 
2009) (“When compared against sentences handed down in the United States for regular crimes, the 
sentences of international criminal tribunals are typically far lower, even though the crimes at these 
tribunals are far greater in both moral depravity and legal significance.” (footnote omitted)). While 
international criminal jurisdiction may well be different for various reasons, such a trend is in line with 
the theory of relative judgments. International courts focused exclusively on mass atrocities (arguably 
those crimes at the very top end of the distribution of severity) displace their sentencing scales 
downward and issue more lenient sentences than those issued by domestic courts (exposed to a wider 
spectrum of criminal behavior) for equivalent, and even milder, offenses. For a similar account of 
“narrow” versus “broad” proportionality, see Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, International Criminal Law 
for Retributivists, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 969, 983 (2014). 
199 Measuring this bias is more complicated because it is in the same direction as the intended 
punitive goals of the court. It is, nevertheless, no less disturbing. Both liberal punishment theory and the 
substantial social cost of incarceration call for punishment no greater than necessary to achieve the 
desired penal goals. Even when aiming to get tough on crime any sentence beyond what is required to 
achieve retribution, deterrence, social protection, and even denunciation cannot be morally or 
practically justified. 
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address the needs of such populations.200 They also develop working 
relations with agencies dealing with offenders and victims of such 
crimes—such as mental health and welfare agencies or community 
organizations—to develop and implement the body of professional 
knowledge on how best to tailor the court’s proceedings to its underlying 
goals.201 Court specialization is often tied to other specialized resources—
from victim and witness specialists202 to social workers and probation 
officers trained with the particular population of offenders.203 
Often, substantive and operational needs are also strongly intertwined. 
Some domestic violence courthouses, for example, are physically 
structured to enhance the protection awarded to victims and to minimize 
disorder at the court: they maintain secured waiting rooms and childcare 
areas and separate victim-only elevators.204 Criminal domestic violence 
courts are sometimes connected to civil courtrooms to facilitate the issuing 
of orders of protection in cases where the defendant is released on bail.205 In 
integrated domestic violence courts, the court’s focus extends beyond just 
criminal cases with one judge handling all criminal domestic violence cases 
and related family issues such as custody, visitation, civil protection orders, 
and matrimonial actions.206 Such an overarching focus on different types of 
legal proceedings and remedies improves victim safety and offender 
200 LABRIOLA ET AL., supra note 131, at 71; LANDIS, supra note 118, at 152–53, 169–70; Judith S. 
Kaye, Delivering Justice Today: A Problem-Solving Approach, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 125, 141 
(2004). 
201 Community courts, drug courts, and domestic violence courts in New York, for example, 
employed a resource coordinator as a link between the court and relevant social services for the 
defendant. Kaye, supra note 200, at 132–33, 136, 142. Drug courts helped link defendants to services 
like job training, health care, education, and housing, id. at 136, and mental-health courts linked 
mentally ill offenders with treatment programs, id. at 137. Community courts also engaged with the 
local community through advisory boards and neighborhood newsletters. Id. at 133. In domestic 
violence courts, judges have been working collaboratively with prosecutors, defense attorneys, criminal 
justice agencies, social services, victims’ advocates, and community organizations in order to develop 
court models and training programs capable of addressing varying needs in combating domestic 
violence. Id. at 142. 
202 Domestic violence courts, for example, are assisted by witness specialists trained with aiding 
child witnesses or victims of sexual assault. LANDIS, supra note 118, at 129–30. 
203 Id. at 139–41. 
204 See, for example, in Chicago, Domestic Violence Courthouse, CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK CTY., 
http://www.cookcountycourt.org/ABOUTTHECOURT/CountyDepartment/DomesticViolence/
DomesticViolenceCourthouse.aspx [https://perma.cc/7Q4A-P2BB]. For a review of 208 domestic 
violence courthouses in the United States, see also LABRIOLA ET AL., supra note 131, at 50–51. 
205 LABRIOLA ET AL., supra note 131, at 50–52; LANDIS, supra note 118, at 47. 
206 See, for example, in New York, Integrated Domestic Violence Court, CTR. FOR COURT
INNOVATION http://www.courtinnovation.org/project/integrated-domestic-violence-court [https://
perma.cc/C9VA-ZMKX]. 
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accountability, which is the main goal of the court, but it conflicts with a 
narrower focus on proportionality within the criminal justice system. 
In such instances, a better balance to enable the desired separate 
treatment, while avoiding undesired biased punishments, could be to 
implement hybrid models of partial specialization. Some judges could be 
appointed to specialize in the subset of cases (based on their prior 
experience or receipt of relevant training), instead of dividing them across 
all judges, but that subset of cases would constitute only part of their 
caseloads while they continue receiving cases of all other types in the 
remaining part of their caseloads.207 The exposure to a general caseload, 
alongside the specialized one, could improve the perceptions of relative 
severity between cases from the specialized docket and all other cases. 
Another possibility would be implementing rotations of judges 
between the generalist and specialized dockets. If judges were assigned to 
specialized dockets only after gaining exposure to the general caseload at 
the criminal court, they could use their previous wider perspective when 
evaluating the cases of the specialized subject matter. If judges were 
removed from the specialized docket back to the generalist court after a 
limited time period, this could prevent the cumulative effect of limited 
exposure at the specialized docket over a long period of time. 
In domestic violence, for example, different courts have implemented 
different approaches. The first municipal district in Cook County, Illinois, 
implements full specialization of judges under the domestic violence 
division. The second municipal district uses a model of partial 
specialization where one judge hears domestic violence cases in addition to 
her general caseload. In New York, judges rotate between the criminal and 
the domestic violence divisions. Through mixed organizational design—
like partial concentration and rotations—some of the benefits of 
specialization can be achieved while the exposure to other types of cases 
can mitigate the contextual influences that exist when handling only 
narrower categories of cases of lower gravity. 
Hybrid solutions admittedly encompass some trade-offs as well. They 
might not always be practical and at times could still hinder some of the 
underlying unique reasons for specialization. The more unique and 
extensive the required training is, the less likely such hybrid solutions are 
to work efficiently. Rotations, for example, have been highly criticized by 
207 Baum draws an analytical distinction between “concentration of judges” and “concentration of 
cases” and acknowledges that “a court or an individual judge can be high on one dimension and low on 
the other.” BAUM, supra note 1, at 6−10. Applying that terminology here, this means that there could be 
specialized dockets (i.e., concentration of cases in one court or before particular judges) but that judges 
would not focus solely on those cases (i.e., there would not be complete concentration of judges). 
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stakeholders at domestic violence courts for hindering judicial expertise 
and consistency of policy and, by that, undermining the unique policy goals 
sought.208 But sometimes hybrid solutions can still offer an improvement 
over complete specialization, and their adequacy should be considered on a 
case-by-case basis. 
IV. STANDARDIZING THE PUNISHMENT CURVE
The concern of nonrepresentative caseloads affecting determinations 
of proportionality and sentences highlights the importance of judicial 
exposure to cases and sentences across the entire spectrum in the relevant 
jurisdiction. As evident by now though, changing the relevant scale of 
cases evaluated through institutional design can only partially help in 
overcoming this bias.209 Often, there are good reasons for specialized 
dockets that lead to a difficult balancing between the costs and benefits of 
such courts. Sometimes even careful initial attention can be later 
jeopardized by amendments and future changes in legislation or staffing of 
the courts. Some forms of limited jurisdiction—such as geographic 
divisions—are simply inevitable. 
If the bounded scope of comparison used by judges leads to 
punishment curves that are shifted in a biased way, the solution is reshifting 
the punishment curve, and perhaps this can be achieved by providing 
judges with statistical information about sentences in cases beyond those 
they encounter firsthand. If a juvenile court judge compares a particular 
defendant only to other juveniles, exposing the judge to the full distribution 
of sentences imposed for the same offense by the adult courts can help her 
compare sentencing levels for adults and juveniles and rescale her 
sentencing decisions. 
I call providing judges with that information “curving discretion.” As 
I illustrate below, statistical curving will require policymakers or judges to 
first make straightforward and transparent choices about the relevant scale 
for comparison—similar offenses, the same charge, or even narrower 
categories defined by aggravating or mitigating circumstances—as well as 
choices about the relevant geographic unit. Then judges would determine 
the factual circumstances of the case that are relevant for sentencing similar 
to what they do today.210 But instead of those circumstances only producing 
208 LABRIOLA ET AL., supra note 131, at 71–72, 77. 
209 See supra Part III. 
210 Such factual findings will remain, as they are today, largely dependent on the facts presented to 
judges by the parties. Facts that are not brought before the court obviously cannot be considered. This, 
however, does not limit the proposal in any way beyond the current practice. The facts that are 
presented—and that serve as the basis for calculating guidelines-recommended sentences—will also 
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a recommendation for the sentencing range, they would also produce a 
graph illustrating the sentences imposed for similar cases. Judges could 
also produce different graphs based on different considerations or for a 
slightly more or less serious charge. Armed with that information, 
sentencing decisions would reflect the relative severity of the particular 
case—in comparison to all other cases not just those in the judge’s 
caseload. 
Section IV.A develops the proposal for curving discretion. Section 
IV.A.1 explains how statistical curving can assist in standardizing
sentences across trial courts and judges. Section IV.A.2 empirically
illustrates and discusses the useful information that can be produced by
curving discretion using examples from different geographic jurisdictions.
Section IV.A.3 suggests an additional benefit of curving discretion: it can
also enhance appellate review of sentences as an overarching mechanism
across different courts.
Because statistical curving is a proposal for social design, it raises 
normative, constitutional, and institutional-competency questions. After the 
detailed explanations of how statistical curving could be implemented, 
Section IV.B addresses these policy questions. 
A. A Proposal for Curving Discretion
1. Statistical Curving of Judicial Discretion.—Statistical curving can
help to overcome sentencing disparities in two important ways. First, it can 
mitigate relative-judgments bias by changing the comparison group used to 
assess cases and by reintroducing forgotten dimensions into the sentencing 
decision. Second, it can more generally reduce disparate outcomes 
(regardless of their source) by providing judges better information on the 
sentences ordered in other cases. In that sense, curving discretion can 
further prove useful to solve part of the idiosyncrasy problem in judicial 
decisions.211 Judges in several states, such as Pennsylvania and Minnesota, 
are already using computerized case-processing systems;212 those systems 
serve as the basis of the punishment curves. It offers an improvement over current practice in that such 
facts could be linked to more informative and granular sentencing recommendations. 
211 For an analysis of the general problem of lack of calibration in legal judgments across 
decisionmakers, see Frederick Schauer & Barbara A. Spellman, Calibrating Legal Judgments, J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS, Nov. 8, 2016, at 1. For a discussion of how sentencing-information systems could be used to 
improve transparency and comparability in sentencing decisions, see Marc L. Miller, A Map of 
Sentencing and a Compass for Judges: Sentencing Information Systems, Transparency, and the Next 
Generation of Reform, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1351 (2005). 
212 See Miller, supra note 211, at 1363–66. 
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could be extended, as was done in other countries,213 to include statistical 
sentencing information as well.214 
a. The relevant universe of cases.—Statistical curving would
first require policymakers to make a straightforward choice about the 
relevant universe for comparison. The decision entails two main 
dimensions: a substantive element about the types of offenses or offenders 
to be compared and a local element about the relevant geographic unit. 
The substantive element requires a deliberate decision about the 
relevant universe of offenses or offenders for equitable treatment, a 
decision that depends on the particular subject matter, the uniqueness of 
cases, and the policy goals that the courts aim to achieve. For juvenile and 
adult courts, for example, the substantive decision entails recognizing that 
the relevant comparison should be based on the particular offense across all 
offenders. Only in such a way can the offender’s personal characteristics, 
including the dimension of being a juvenile, be properly taken into account. 
As a result, the decision about the sentencing curve would be that: (1) it 
should portray the sentences ordered in both adult and juvenile courts and 
(2) juvenile court judges should adjust their sentences in a way that will
maintain harmony and proportionality between them and the sentences
ordered for adults and juveniles at the criminal courts. There is no dispute
that juveniles should be sentenced more leniently than adults should. The
forced comparison between the sentence of juveniles and adults across
courts could help ensure actual sentences indeed follow that desired policy.
When cases are determined to be unique, as discussed in Section 
II.C.3 above, the decision might go the opposite way. For domestic
violence cases, for example, the societal stance is that what makes such
cases severe is not the magnitude of physical harm caused but the creation
of an abusive domestic environment. When domestic violence cases are
heard by a general criminal court, the concern is that the comparison to
assault and battery cases would make the dimension of physical harm too
salient and lead to underestimating the uniqueness of the domestic aspect.
With that policy goal in mind, when domestic violence offenses are heard
by both specialized and generalist courts, the decision about the
punishment curve would entail: (1) aggregating the sentences at both
domestic violence and criminal courts and (2) ensuring that judges at the
213 Id. at 1371–75 (discussing successful sentencing-information systems used in Scotland and New 
South Wales, Australia). 
214 Id. at 1380–81 (“[I]n most systems, much of the information that would serve as the basis for [a 
sentencing-information system] is already collected and analyzed; it is just not shared, or if shared, it is 
not shared in a form that judges and others . . . can use . . . .”). 
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criminal courts adjust their sentences based on the sentencing levels 
developed by the specialized judges in domestic violence courtrooms. 
The geographic element of the decision requires policymakers to 
decide what is the relevant local unit for the comparison of actual 
sentences—the district courthouse, the county, or the state. Different states 
might reach different conclusions on this question, but what is important is 
that they address it straightforwardly.215 
The decision about the relevant universe of cases for comparison—
and displaying information about sentences in all such cases through 
statistical curving—could help to mitigate the relative-judgments bias in 
judicial sentencing decisions. Making the necessity of such a comparison 
an explicit stage of the sentencing process can reintroduce neglected factors 
into the sentencing decision. If the dimension of being a juvenile might lose 
its diagnostic value in a comparison across juveniles, the forced 
comparison between juvenile and adult sentences makes it extremely 
relevant again. The regained salience of such relevant considerations for 
sentencing would ensure they are given adequate weight in the final 
decision of the court. The explicit comparison across cases of varying 
degrees of severity can also rescale the relative evaluations of severity onto 
a standardized scale. If the within-sample case evaluation were based on 
the relative severity of the juvenile case against the other cases in the 
juvenile court, mapping the case onto the joint distribution of sentences for 
all offenders would make salient the lesser severity of a juvenile compared 
to an adult. 
The exercise of mapping particular cases against the universe of 
relevant conduct will also serve to inform judges. It will help judges 
become aware not only of the existence of disparities but also of their 
sources and of the fact that they are truly unwarranted. Currently, even 
where judges are aware of the existence of sentencing disparities, 
disparities prevail because judges often either rationalize them or accept 
them as based on differences of opinion. They think either those different 
courts have justified reasons to sentence differently or that other judges are 
wrong.216 
215 Policymakers, for example, could be sensitive to the varied demographic or socioeconomic 
conditions across jurisdictions that are correlated with the development of different sentencing patterns 
or to which central prison defendants are being sent. Even when disparate sentencing curves across 
courts persist, the geographic element can account for the differences in the geographic domains of trial 
courts and jail or prison facilities, and parole boards could use the different curves to adjust sentences 
and to enable better comparisons across prisoners for early-release decisions. 
216 During my research for this Article, I talked to many state and federal judges. Overwhelmingly 
common to all judges was how quickly the issue of geographic disparities surfaced. Practically all 
judges recognized that different district courthouses sentence differently. And all judges referred to 
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Educating judges about the bias underlying the problem can help 
change behavior by questioning the current underlying justifications. An 
explicit policy decision that all cases within a certain universe should be 
treated equitably—and that the universe includes cases from all courts—
can induce judges to move from explaining the differences to changing 
them. Providing the curve according to which sentences should be 
standardized will offer guidance on exactly how to do so. 
b. Addressing disparate outcomes.—Statistical guidelines can
address the bias introduced by relative judgment in an additional way: 
targeting its disparate outcomes directly. If relative judgments lead to 
sentencing disparities, we can address them similarly to how we would 
address any other kind of disparities regardless of their sources. Like 
standardization in other fields, statistical curving can curb sentencing 
disparities by standardizing the curve on which cases are evaluated. 
Statistical curving offers a metric to evaluate trial judges’ sentencing 
behavior and thus can help the judiciary develop and implement norms of 
uniformity from within. Court actors are usually immersed in the local 
caseload, but statistical curving will make the decisions by other judges and 
courts more accessible and will be more informative about the trends they 
represent.217 Judges are also likely averse to being outliers—if they are 
concerned about not being retained (for appointed judges) or reelected (for 
elected judges), they might not want to be viewed as excessively harsh or 
lenient. Appellate review may have a greater bite once appellate courts are 
better informed about how other judges exercise their discretion.218 
Further, because the punishment curve is generated for cases with 
similar circumstances, statistical curving can promote better reasoning. The 
reasons provided by judges as relevant considerations in sentencing will 
such differences along at least one of these two lines of reasoning. The first is that the different 
sentencing levels developed at different courts are the result of different needs or goals. Different 
district courthouses, the explanation goes, cater to different constituents, or deal with different local 
pressing needs and, therefore, reach different outcomes. When such substantive justifications do not 
exist, judges often think the judges at the other court are simply wrong. Judges at suburban districts 
facing relatively low crime levels acknowledged that their sentencing levels are much higher than those 
of a neighboring urban district—one judge even facetiously wondered why any offender would choose 
to commit a crime only a few blocks into their jurisdiction. Their explanation was that while the urban 
court is overwhelmed with cases, they send the proper message that crime does not pay. Judges at larger 
urban districts observed the same trends but offered an opposite explanation: the suburban judges don’t 
see “real crime,” they said, and therefore do not realize how petty the things they punish so harshly are. 
They, at the urban court, see all crimes, and they know what is truly important. 
217 For a discussion of the relationship between sentencing guidelines and statistical curving, see 
infra Section IV.B.1. 
218 For the desirability of appellate review as an overarching mechanism in the post-Booker era, see 
infra Section IV.B.2. 
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affect the curve that is produced, and judges therefore will benefit from 
providing better and more detailed reasons for their decisions. When a 
judge decides to impose a sentence different than the sentence generally 
ordered for similar cases by other judges, the need to justify the particular 
deviation from the majority view of the courts would also increase. 
Because such reasons can only include permissible considerations in 
sentencing, curving discretion can also mitigate the weight granted to 
impermissible considerations and, by that, help more generally with 
overcoming other biases in sentencing decisions. 
The focus of this Article is on the impact of caseload composition on 
judicial sentencing decisions, and it focuses on that feature because the 
caseload effect has not gained scholarly (or practically any) attention to 
date. The existence of other biases in sentencing, however, and of 
interjudge sentencing disparities, is widely recognized. Curving discretion 
can more effectively address some of those issues and at least partially 
solve part of the idiosyncrasy problem in judicial decisions. 
2. Illustrating Statistical Curving.—To illustrate what curving
discretion might look like, this Section offers an empirical example, 
comparing the punishment curves across courts of different geographic 
jurisdiction. While no division of jurisdiction is completely arbitrary, 
geographic jurisdiction is perhaps the closest. This is also an area where at 
least the rhetoric around sentencing guidelines is that sentencing disparities 
are unwarranted. And both penal codes and sentencing guidelines are 
promulgated at the state level to be applied by local courts. For these 
reasons, it is a useful example to illustrate how statistical curving can be 
used, if we want to harmonize sentencing levels across courts. 
Section IV.A.2.a reviews the data. Section IV.A.2.b discusses the 
intra- and interdistrict differences that are revealed when comparing actual 
sentences imposed to the sentences recommended by the guidelines. 
Section IV.A.2.c explains how to construct the sentencing curve that relates 
to the sentencing guidelines range and how it is affected by the decision 
about the relevant geographic unit for comparison. Section IV.A.2.d 
extends the uses of sentencing curves to comparisons across offense-
severity levels and guidelines categories. 
This Section’s aim is illustrative, not analytical. The data available for 
researchers is obviously less granular than the information before the judge 
hearing the case. Therefore, the analysis is not meant to suggest what 
sentence should have been imposed in any particular case nor to identify 
what sentencing levels should be for any offense. I also do not make any 
causal claim regarding the source of the observed disparities. The analysis 
is only meant to illustrate how such a model would work. In practice, 
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statistical curving could be based on any information available to the judge, 
including anything currently used for calculating the guidelines range as 
well as any other relevant circumstances of the offense and the offender.219 
a. Data.—I use sentencing data from the Pennsylvania Courts of
Common Pleas for the years 2001−2012.220 Pennsylvania is particularly 
suited for the purpose of this analysis due to its sentencing guidelines 
regime. Because Pennsylvania uses a sentencing guidelines matrix, it offers 
the opportunity to compare the type of guidance for judicial discretion that 
is offered under the current guidelines with the one that could be achieved 
using statistical curving. Pennsylvania’s guidelines have been advisory 
throughout the period of study221—as is now the regime in the federal 
courts and in all states that use sentencing guidelines, following the 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker.222 
Pennsylvania has an indeterminate sentencing system223 with 
sentencing guidelines setting a range for the minimum sentence, stated in 
months of incarceration. The guidelines’ instructions for the minimum 
sentence are similar to those under the federal system. The recommended 
sentencing range is the result of two scores assigned by the guidelines for 
each offense224: (1) an “Offense Gravity Score” (OGS), which takes into 
account the gravity of the offense of conviction and ranges from one to 
fourteen,225 and (2) a “Prior Record Score” (PRS), which weighs the 
seriousness and extent of the offender’s prior criminal record and is divided 
219 Miller, supra note 211 (explaining how sentencing-information systems can include a wide 
array of sentencing considerations beyond those covered by the guidelines, including offense- and 
offender-specific circumstances and even punishment goals). 
220 The sentencing recommendations for the examined offenses remained the same under the 
different guidelines editions over the years. Sentencing Guidelines and Implementation Manuals, PA. 
COMM’N ON SENTENCING, http://www.pcs.la.psu.edu/guidelines/sentencing/sentencing-guidelines-and-
implementation-manuals [https://perma.cc/JUB9-GFV4]. 
221 Under advisory guidelines, judges retain discretion to impose a sentence outside the guidelines 
range subject to mandatory minimum and statutory maximum sentences when such apply. If a judge 
deviates from the guidelines range, she must specifically state the reasons for departure in a written 
statement. Sentences inside the guidelines also pose a heightened burden on the defendant on appeal 
compared to sentences outside the guidelines range. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9781 (2016). 
222 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
223 When imposing a sentence of partial or total confinement, Pennsylvania requires the court to 
impose both a minimum and a maximum sentence. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9755−56 (2016). The 
sentencing guidelines and most mandatory sentencing provisions address only the minimum sentence, 
and that is my focus here as well. The range between the minimum and maximum sentence is a part of 
the sentence to be decided later by the parole board. 
224 204 PA. CODE § 303.2 (2015). 
225 Id. § 303.15. Except for murder in the first and second degree, which is prescribed either a 
mandatory life sentence or capital punishment. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102 (2016). 
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into eight categories.226 Based on a matrix of OGS and PRS combinations, 
the sentencing guidelines categorize offenses into five levels. Within each 
level, the guidelines prescribe three ranges: (1) a standard range, for use 
under normal circumstances, (2) an aggravated range, for use when the 
judge determines that there are aggravating circumstances, and (3) a 
mitigated range, for use when the judge determines that there are mitigating 
circumstances.227 
For the purposes of this illustration, the analysis focuses on one group 
of cases with circumstances that are as similar as possible. The category of 
cases that has both a large number of cases for such a comparison and 
sufficient granularity about particular circumstances is drug cases. Among 
drug cases, the largest sample for cases that routinely result in substantial 
periods of incarceration is for those involving possession of cocaine with 
intent to distribute. To guard against the impact of other sentencing 
provisions that may override the sentencing guidelines’ recommendations, I 
exclude cases that carry a youth, school, or gun statutory enhancement or a 
mandatory minimum sentence, as well as cases where the defendant was 
found to need treatment for drug or alcohol dependence.228 
The sentencing recommendation for a case is determined based on the 
intersection of the OGS and the offender’s PRS. For the main analysis, I 
focus on one guidelines category at the intersection of (1) the offense of 
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute at least 2.5 to less than 10 
grams, a felony with an OGS of 7,229 and (2) defendants with a PRS of level 
2.230 An amount of 2.5 to 10 grams is, indeed, a relatively wide range. 
However, that is the quantity range currently included under the same 
guidelines category. I use the same quantity range in the main analysis in 
226 The categories, by order of increasing severity, are: No prior record (0), five categories based on 
the number and severity of prior record (1−5), Repeat Felony Offender (RFEL), and Repeat Violent 
Offender (REVOC). 204 PA. CODE § 303.4 (2015). 
227 Id. § 303.16(a). 
228 For the same reason, I also drop a few cases where the recorded guidelines sentencing range 
differed from the recommended range under the guidelines. 
229 The three mildest quantity categories for the offense under the guidelines have the highest 
caseloads by a large margin (with between 3,775 and 12,856 cases in each category compared to 98 to 
874 cases in the other three categories). From those three, the main analysis focuses on the middle 
category (2.5−<10 grams) in order to allow for cross-category comparison with the less and more 
serious categories in Section IV.A.2.d. 
230 The three largest prior record categories for this offense are no prior record (n = 2,432), a prior 
record score of 2 (n = 899), and a prior record score of 5 (n = 1,015). For first-time offenders, the 
likelihood of incarceration is lower as the recommended sentencing range includes zero incarceration, 
and the focus of the graphic presentation is on sentences of incarceration. For “career criminals,” 
sentences are substantially affected by the defendant’s prior conduct rather than mainly driven by the 
offenses in question. I therefore focus on the category of OGS = 2. Results are similar for different 
categories. 
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order to illustrate the difference between the current guidance given to 
judges—i.e., that guidelines range—and the guidance that statistical 
curving could offer. But I also show how sentences are divided based on 
finer gradations of quantity. The same patterns persist when looking at 
different offense categories and at offenders with varying degrees of prior 
record. 
b. The difference between recommended and actual
sentences.—The recommended sentencing range for an OGS
of 7 and a PRS of 2 is twelve to eighteen months.231 If the judge finds that 
mitigating or aggravating circumstances exist, she may reduce or increase 
the sentence by up to six months, resulting in an overall sentencing range 
of six to twenty-four months.232 
Philadelphia is the most populous county with the largest caseloads. 
Neighboring Philadelphia is the midsized Delaware County. A little further, 
still within the eastern district of Pennsylvania, is the smaller Lehigh 
County.233 During the period of the study, 56 judges in the three counties 
sentenced 380 such cases—with individual dockets ranging from 1 to 70 
cases.234 Figure 1 displays the distribution of actual sentences ordered in 
those cases. 
As is evident from Figure 1, the range of sentences actually imposed is 
confined within the guidelines’ recommended sentencing range only in 
Lehigh. In both Philadelphia and Delaware, the range of actual sentences is 
much wider than that recommended by the guidelines. While the 
guidelines’ recommended range for sentencing (even the extended range) is 
six to twenty-four months, actual sentences range from zero to thirty-six 
months in Delaware and from zero to sixty months in Philadelphia. 
Granted, differences across cases can result from differences in 
unobservable case characteristics, not just from divergence in judicial 
propensities to punish. Still, the distributions shown in Figure 1 exhibit 
greater variance than what is implied by the guidelines regime. Actual 
sentences are spread over thirty-six- to sixty-month intervals—200% to 
330% wider even in comparison to the recommended extended range of 
eighteen months (between six to twenty-four), which incorporates 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. This, remember, is for cases 
that, at least from observable data, do not include what legislators 
231 PA. CODE § 303.16. 
232 Id. 
233 These are the counties with the largest caseloads for the offense category that are within the 
same district. 
234 Thirty-three judges in Philadelphia, fifteen judges in Delaware, and eight judges in Lehigh. 
111:1205 (2017) Punishing on a Curve 
1259 
recognize as extreme circumstances that justify different sentencing 
schedules. These are cases that do not involve circumstances that trigger 
statutory enhancements or mandatory minimum sentences, and these are 
defendants who were not referred to treatment for drug or alcohol abuse. 
FIGURE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF SENTENCES, BY COUNTY 
Note: Figure 1 presents the distribution of sentences for the offense of 
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute 2.5–<10 grams (OGS = 7) for 
defendants with a prior record score of 2. Each bar represents the proportion 
of sentences within the one-month interval. 
The cross-county comparison also reveals the great local discrepancies 
in sentencing levels. Philadelphia County has the most cases in that 
category and high case volume in general, and the distribution of sentences 
is highly skewed with 30.5% of cases not sentenced to incarceration at 
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all.235 In the smaller counties, however, completely avoiding incarceration 
is rare: that is the disposition only in 1.4% of cases in the midsized 
Delaware County236 and not even in a single case in Lehigh County. The 
sentencing distributions extend over a narrower range in the smaller 
counties—twelve months in Lehigh and thirty-six months in Delaware—
compared to the sixty-month range in Philadelphia. They are also much 
more bell shaped—with the mode of the distribution (the most frequent 
sentences) lying within the recommended guidelines range—potentially 
suggesting that judges in courts with smaller caseloads implement less 
variance (and fewer within-category distinctions) in their sentencing 
decisions. 
c. Constructing the sentencing curve.—If different geographic
jurisdictions develop different sentencing levels, the decision about the 
relevant unit for jurisdiction can change the sentencing curves used by 
judges and provide guidance to judges about desired sentencing levels 
overall. 
As a first step, suppose each county produces its own sentencing 
curve—similarly to how sentencing levels are locally developed today. 
From the distribution of actual sentences presented in Figure 1, it is 
possible to calculate the density curve of sentences and construct the 
sentencing curve used by the judges in each county, as displayed in Figure 
2.237 Those sentencing curves can serve as the county’s statistical-curving 
recommendation. 
The cross-county comparison reveals one way in which the current 
guidelines may serve as focal points for sentencing: the median sentences 
in the counties tend to cluster around the lower end of the guidelines range 
and equal about 11.5 to 12 months in all counties. The average sentence is 
in the lower half of the standard sentencing range and equals between 12.8 
and 13.5 months. But the comparison also reveals the insufficiency of such 
focal points to harmonize sentencing levels. 
235 81 out of 266 cases. 
236 In only 1 case out of 71 there was no incarceration sanction. 
237 I use kernel density curves with a width of six months. Because, as is evident from Figure 1, 
sentences tend to cluster around six-month figures (at months six, twelve, eighteen, etc.), the choice of 
width enables displays of smoother curves and eases the visual comparison. The choice is esthetic, not 
substantive, and using narrower widths (or even the histograms themselves) would not change the 
comparisons drawn. 
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FIGURE 2: SENTENCING CURVES, BY COUNTY 
Note: Figure 2 presents the kernel density curves that correspond to the 
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The standard guidelines’ sentencing range is twelve to eighteen 
months. Yet in both larger counties, only one-third of cases are actually 
sentenced within it,238 compared to 60% of the cases in Lehigh County. In 
most cases, different counties end up with very different sentencing 
outcomes and depart from the guidelines ranges at very different rates. 
Downward departures are infrequent in Delaware, where they occur in 
8.5% of cases, and nonexistent in Lehigh. But they occur in 33.8% of cases 
in Philadelphia. Departures above the guidelines in Philadelphia are four 
times more likely than in Delaware and did not occur in even one case in 
Lehigh.239 
The inter-county differences are manifested not only in the treatment 
of extreme cases at the ends of the distribution but also in the full range of 
sentences applied by the courts. The width of the interquartile range varies 
by county by 600%—from three to eighteen months. Sentencing levels 
relative to the guidelines’ recommendations also vary widely. In Lehigh, 
the interquartile range accommodates only the lower half of the standard 
sentencing range. In Delaware, the interquartile range is wider and includes 
both the standard and part of the mitigated range. In Philadelphia, the 
interquartile range includes the standard range, the mitigated range, and 
below it. 
If such disparate sentencing practices across counties are unwarranted, 
policymakers might wish to consolidate the sentencing curve across the 
different counties. The relevant jurisdiction could include, for example, all 
cases in the eastern district of Pennsylvania (Figure 3.A) or be wider to 
spread across the state of Pennsylvania as a whole (Figure 3.B). As the 
chosen area of jurisdiction widens, the curve averages the differences 
across extreme counties and follows more closely the sentencing 
guidelines’ recommendations. As can be seen from Figure 3, the 
interquartile range based on the Pennsylvania sentencing curve resembles 
more closely the guidelines’ recommendations: it extends from nine to 
eighteen months—slightly wider than the standard recommended 
sentencing range of twelve to eighteen months but still within the mitigated 
range above six months. 
238 In Philadelphia, 29% of cases (77 out of 266 cases) and in Delaware, 35% (25 out of 72). 
239 Sentences higher than twenty-four months are ordered in 16% of cases in Philadelphia (43 
cases) in comparison to 4.2% of cases (3 cases) in Delaware. 
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FIGURE 3: THE JOINT SENTENCING CURVE 
Note: Figure 3 presents the kernel density curves for the eastern district (Panel 
A) and for the State of Pennsylvania (Panel B) for the offense of possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute 2.5–<10 grams (OGS = 7) for defendants with
a prior record score of 2.
Notice that because the statistical curving is based on the actual 
sentences imposed, it does not necessarily impose rigidity or narrower 
categories. In the current example, the interquartile range is three months 
wider than the standard sentencing range recommended by the guidelines. 
According to the Pennsylvania sentencing curve, 90% of the cases will be 
sentenced between zero and thirty-six months—allowing for a range of 
discretion twice as wide as that proposed by the guidelines’ extended range 
(six to twenty-four months). But that discretion could be applied more 
consistently across the districts—emphasizing variation that is rooted in the 
circumstances of particular cases, not in local sentencing levels. 
The fact that the curve is not identical to the sentencing range 
recommended by the guidelines is not unexpected. Any biases that 
currently exist are incorporated into it. Theoretically, the sentencing curve 
does not necessarily need to be completely aligned with the sentencing 
guidelines’ recommendations. If, for example, many courts display outright 
policy disagreement with the guidelines recommendations (as they may 
under Kimbrough v. United States240 and Spears v. United States241), the 
sentencing curve will reflect the same disagreement. 
240 552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
Med Meded ed 
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The conceptual desirability of such curving does not necessarily 
depend on either the width or the location of the range. The point is that 
statistical curving based on how judicial discretion was applied in actual 
cases gives judges flexibility to develop sentencing levels while at the same 
time facilitating coherence across judges.242 To the extent that existing 
variation is rooted in too little guidance from the guidelines, this variation 
will gradually decrease as judges move their sentencing choices closer to 
each other. To the extent variance does not decrease, judges should then 
evaluate their sentencing choices based on the real “going rates” because 
those are clearly only loosely tied to the recommended guidelines range.243 
Importantly, the decision on the relevant level of jurisdiction as it is 
currently implemented already entails a decision about the sentencing 
levels that will be developed in the courts. Statistical curving does not 
change that in any way; it simply makes it transparent. 
d. Levels of comparison.—Curving discretion can also enable
judges to take into account the impact of different considerations in 
sentencing. This exercise can facilitate coherence both across and within 
guidelines categories. Across guidelines categories, it will assist judges in 
evaluating the relationships between the actual sentences associated with 
increasing offense gravity scores or prior record scores. Within categories, 
this will better enable judges to standardize a particular sentence against the 
distribution of overall sentences in the category. 
Figure 4 depicts how sentencing curves can be used to compare the 
overall impact of offense gravity on sentencing outcomes across the 
guidelines categories.244 Figure 5 illustrates the use of curving to create 
more granular distinctions within offenses by displaying the sentences for 
possessing different amounts of cocaine in 2.5 gram intervals. Panel A (less 
than 2.5 grams) corresponds to an OGS score of 6. Panel E (at least 10 and 
241 555 U.S. 261, 264–66 (2009) (per curiam). 
242 I discuss the practical and normative aspects in the division of powers to determine sentencing 
levels across judges and legislators further below. See infra Section IV.B.3. 
243 Similarly, punishment curves can be useful whether the sources of observed disparities are plea 
bargaining by prosecutors in the shadow of the judge or, perhaps, judicial decisions in the shadow of 
prosecutors. If the source of variation is judge-based disparities, then statistical curving could better 
fulfill the current role aspired to by the sentencing guidelines. If the variance is driven by plea bargains, 
then exposing the real “going rates” supports providing judges with similar power to that of 
prosecutors. 
244 Different guidelines categories recommend different sentencing ranges, and to simplify the 
graphic presentation, Figure 4 displays only the sentencing curves and average sentences for each 
category. Each weight category is associated with a higher offense gravity score of 6, 7, 8, 10, or 11. 
The relevant associated guidelines categories for a PRS of 2 are in order of increasing severity: 9−16 
(±6) [n = 1909], 12−18 (±6) [n = 899], 15−21 (±9) [n = 488], 36−48 (±12) [n = 122], and 48−66 (±12) 
[n = 126]. 
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less than 12.5 grams) is carved from cases charged for possession of 
10−<50 grams, an offense with a gravity score of 8. Panels B, C, and D 
divide the possession of at least 2.5 and less than 10 grams analyzed in 
Sections IV.A.2.b–c above (OGS = 7) to three equal-weight categories. 
FIGURE 4: SENTENCING CURVES FOR PENNSYLVANIA, BY OGS CATEGORIES OF DRUG
QUANTITY, PRS=2 
Note: Each curve represents the kernel density curve for the distribution of 
sentences for each OGS−PRS combination for all cases in Pennsylvania. The 
solid curve corresponds to the curve in Figure 3.B. Vertical lines mark the 
mean sentence ordered in each guidelines category. 
The comparison demonstrates the two problems statistical curving can 
answer. First, even across distinctive categories, great sentencing variance 
exists, and actual sentencing ranges largely overlap (Figure 4). Second, the 
weight given to a particular circumstance—drug weight—crucially depends 
on the amount of guidance given by the sentencing guidelines (Figure 5). 
Where the guidelines draw a clear line across drug quantities, average 
sentences increase with drug quantity. But within the same guidelines 
category, higher drug quantity barely affects the average sentence. 
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FIGURE 5: SENTENCING CURVES, BY DRUG QUANTITY, PRS = 2 
A. <2.5 g (N = 1909)
B. 2.5–<5 g (N = 538)
C. 5–<7.5 g (N = 228)
D. 7.5–<10 g (N = 133)
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From Figure 5, for possession of less than 2.5 grams, the median and 
mean sentences are 9 and 10.4 months, respectively. In comparison, for 
possession of between 2.5 and 5 grams, the median and mean sentences are 
3 months longer (12 and 13.8 months, respectively). Similarly, for 
possession of between 10 and 12.5 grams, the median and average 
sentences are 18 and 22.7 months, respectively, in comparison to 12 and 
15.9 months, respectively, for possession of between 7.5 and 10 grams—a 
difference of 6 to 7 months. 
While intervals of 2.5 grams play a large role in sentencing across 
guidelines ranges, within the recommended range for possession of at least 
2.5 and less than 10 grams, changes in drug quantity have at most a modest 
effect on sentencing. The average sentence is 13.8 months for possession of 
at least 2.5 and less than 5 grams, 15.4 months for possession of at least 5 
and less than 7.5 grams, and 15.9 months for possession of at least 7.5 and 
less than 10 grams. 
Even the source of that variation is mainly driven by extreme 
decisions, and across all three categories, the median sentence equals 
twelve months. On the mildest end of the sentences, possessing more than 
7.5 grams decreases the probability of avoiding incarceration completely 
by one-fifth: 16.4% and 15.4% of cases involving possession of 2.5 to 5 
and 5 to 7.5 grams, respectively, are not sentenced to incarceration, 
compared to 13.5% of the cases involving possession of 7.5 to 10 grams. 
On the upper end of the sentences, the probability of imposing a sentence 
of thirty-six months or higher increases by one-fifth—from 10% to 12% to 
15%—as drug quantity increases. After excluding cases with sentences 
equal to 0 or to 36 months and higher, even the small gap in sentences 
practically disappears, and average sentences are 13.5, 14.5, and 13.9 
months, respectively. Similar patterns persist when looking at other offense 
categories. 
Taken together, the effect illustrated by the guidelines fits with a 
theory of relative judgments: across guidelines categories, where different 
sentencing recommendations exist, a difference of 2.5 grams in the quantity 
of cocaine possessed leads to substantial differences across all cases, as 
reflected in the average and median sentences. Within a guidelines 
category, absent more granular guidance, a difference of 2.5 grams in drug 
quantity leads to a different outcome for extreme cases at the ends of the 
distributions but barely creates any differentiation across the bulk of cases 
within the range. 
This result should be normatively perplexing. Guidelines cutoff points 
are largely arbitrary—there is no substantively prevalent reason to draw a 
line exactly at 2.5 or 10 grams instead of at 5 grams. From a normative 
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perspective, “uniformity does not consist simply of similar sentences for 
those convicted of violations of the same statute . . . . It consists, more 
importantly, of similar relationships between sentences and real 
conduct.”245 Yet, actual sentences reflect a differentiation that is not based 
on real conduct but rather on the statutory veil of that conduct. A potential 
advantage of statistical curving is, therefore, that it can create continuous 
differentiation within the ranges given by the penal code or guidelines 
matrix. That way it can better address the desire for proportionality across 
cases of increasing severity and overall coherence in sentencing. 
3. The Overarching Role of Appellate Review.—The specialized–
generalist spectrum can also contribute to assessing the role of appellate 
review in harmonizing sentencing levels. Appellate courts, after all, are 
meant to serve as an overarching mechanism—overseeing the decisions of 
all judges and trial courts under their jurisdiction, vacating extreme 
decisions, and providing guidance to trial judges on how to exercise their 
discretion.246 Notably, appellate courts are also generalists. And as trial 
courts’ jurisdiction becomes increasingly narrower, the generalist nature of 
appellate courts gains greater importance. 
If the institutional structure of trial courts leads to biased sentencing 
curves, this provides an additional justification for increased appellate 
review of sentences. Statistical curving can facilitate such appellate review. 
In Pennsylvania, sentences within the guidelines range are appealable only 
if they “involve[] circumstances where the application of the guidelines 
would be clearly unreasonable,”247 and sentences outside the guidelines can 
be vacated on appeal if “the sentence is unreasonable.”248 So departures are 
appealable, but because the guidelines are only advisory, what would 
determine the unreasonableness of a sentence? 
245 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 253–54 (2005). 
246 For the role of appellate review as a harmonizing mechanism, see generally, Jose A. Cabranes, 
Reforming the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Appellate Review of Discretionary Sentencing 
Decisions, 1 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 177 (1994); Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and 
Sentence Appeals: A Comparison of Federal and State Experiences, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1441 (1997). 
This was also the view of early reformers. See MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT § 3-208 
cmt. (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1979) (“Appellate review of sentencing 
is a fundamental aspect of the act’s presumptive sentencing system. . . . Appellate review of each 
sentencing court’s decisions in these matters will insure that departures from the guidelines are 
consistent with the standards established in the act and also that new situations will be uniformly 
handled throughout a state. Appellate review will facilitate the development of a ‘common law of 
sentencing’ to buttress and supplement the guidelines of the commission.”). 
247 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9781(c)(2) (2016). 
248 Id. § 9781(c)(3). 
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Instead of evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence based on cases 
cherry-picked by the parties or the nonrepresentative sample of cases that 
reach the appellate courts, statistical curving provides that information in a 
much more extensive format. Statistical curving can assist courts in 
evaluating not just the existence of certain sentences for certain offenses 
but also their prevalence and frequency of use. The distribution arising 
from statistical curving, based on a large number of actual sentences, might 
suggest, for example, a closer appellate review for sentences that are in the 
top 5% of the sentencing distribution—in this example, sentences higher 
than thirty-six months. Or the criterion might be sentences that are further 
than two standard deviations from the average—in this example, with an 
average of 14.5 months and a standard deviation of 11.7 months, sentences 
higher than 37.9 months. Appellate courts could still be sensitive to local 
norms and other factors in deciding whether or not to vacate a sentence in a 
particular case, but the curve would provide a useful starting point for the 
evaluation of reasonableness. 
As judges change their sentencing practices, what is reasonable and 
unreasonable would change accordingly, facilitating both uniformity and 
flexibility over time. As a theoretical matter, if the sentencing range offered 
by the sentencing curves narrows, it will be because there is greater judicial 
consensus around the sentencing of an offense. Curbing judicial departures 
in such cases through appellate review is, therefore, less troubling, even to 
opponents of narrow limits on judicial discretion, because it is not 
subordinating judicial discretion to mandatory ranges. Rather, it is 
truncating judicial outliers according to the majority view of the courts.249 
Such curbing would also not prevent a dynamic change in the 
sentencing curve caused by a change in the judiciary’s or legislature’s 
approach to certain crimes. A particular crime epidemic might justify 
enhancing sentencing levels. A societal shift that views certain crimes as 
less repellant could justify more mitigated sentences. When legislators 
change the recommended sentence for certain offenses, judges should take 
account of the change. In such cases, judges could depart from current 
sentencing practices because the goal of statistical curving is to offer 
guidance rather than strict rules. If such cases are appealed, appellate courts 
could, similarly, weigh the reasons for and desirability of changing 
sentencing practices. The fact that initial outliers might reach the appellate 
courts should be viewed as a benefit not a shortcoming. This would enable 
249 For a discussion of the desirability of appellate review and the standard of review on appeal pre- 
and post-Booker, see infra Section IV.B.2. 
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appellate courts to review the matter sooner and offer guidance to the trial 
courts. 
B. Curving Discretion and Sentencing Policy
Statistical curving is admittedly a proposal for social design, and 
therefore, the call for its implementation should be supported both 
practically and normatively. This Section offers such support in three 
aspects. Section IV.B.1 explains why statistical curving suits the spirit of 
the guidelines enterprise and of penal justifications more generally. Section 
IV.B.2 demonstrates why, under existing sentencing jurisprudence,
statistical curving is both an adequate and a constitutional way to address
the desire for coherence and proportionality in sentencing. Section IV.B.3
explains how statistical curving also addresses some often-raised concerns
about the institutional roles of legislators, judges, and prosecutors in
shaping sentencing levels, as well as the political economy of sentencing.
It is worth emphasizing one important point: If the institutional design 
of courts and the mechanisms for case assignment affect case outcomes, 
not addressing these issues is its own form of social design. Embracing the 
status quo of varied court models and wide discretion by local 
administrators is itself a choice to maintain a particular political economy 
of franchised sentencing. As long as one recognizes two basic truths—that 
some forms of limited jurisdiction are inevitable and that consistency in 
sentencing is desirable—the only potential remedy can come through the 
design of sentencing recommendations for the courts and their enforcement 
through appellate review. 
1. Empiricism and “A Common Law of Sentencing.”—Existing
sentencing guidelines aim to achieve a similar goal. Seeking to address the 
increasing sentencing disparities across judges, sentencing commissions 
have offered a menu of sentences to be used for different offenses, curbing 
judicial discretion to impose extreme sentences or consider impermissible 
factors.250 Historically, sentencing guidelines achieved this function by 
restricting departures from the guidelines range; after United States v. 
Booker, advisory guidelines serve as an informative baseline for calculating 
sentences and as focal points.251 
250 For an overview of the desire to balance uniformity and proportionality in the sentencing 
guidelines, see, for example, Susan R. Klein & Jordan M. Steiker, The Search for Equality in Criminal 
Sentencing, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 223. 
251 See generally John F. Pfaff, The Continued Vitality of Structured Sentencing Following 
Blakely: The Effectiveness of Voluntary Guidelines, 54 UCLA L. REV. 235 (2006). 
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But that task was not as easy to achieve, and “[t]he Guidelines have 
made few friends in their two decades of existence, garnering criticism 
from judges and scholars alike.”252 Ranking all offenses proved to be 
immensely difficult and even more difficult to do ex ante: “A legislature 
cannot know ex ante all the situations that will fall within the law’s ambit, 
and in the criminal context, it tends to err on the side of sweeping too much 
rather than too little within a law’s terms.”253 The desire to curb sentencing 
disparities on the one hand, while leaving enough room for judicial 
discretion in particular cases on the other, resulted in wide ranges for each 
offense—at least several months and often several years254—and caused a 
vigorous debate about the role and desirability of guidelines departures.255 
Guidelines matrices, however, give no guidance on how to implement 
(and evaluate) judicial discretion, even within the range. Judges have little 
guidance on how to rank particular cases or how to translate ordinal 
rankings into cardinal rankings. If different courts develop different 
sentencing curves, the sentences for similar offenses will vary based on 
their relative rankings on each of the different sentencing curves. But even 
where such differences seem unwarranted to judges themselves, no 
mechanisms currently exist to facilitate convergence around similar 
sentences. Court actors are usually immersed in the local caseload. 
Appellate courts could potentially perform an overarching role in 
standardizing sentencing levels, but the deferential standard of appellate 
review makes vacated sentences a rare phenomenon. Meanwhile, the 
increased use of computer programs by judges for calculating guidelines 
ranges offers a potential avenue for constructing sentencing 
recommendations that can help overcome some of the informational 
hurdles. 
252 Rachel E. Barkow, The Devil You Know: Federal Sentencing After Blakely, 16 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 312, 312 (2004); see also, e.g., KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 5–6 (1998); Bowman, Dead Law Walking, supra 
note 17, at 1230; Freed, supra note 18, at 1685–87; Marc Miller, Rehabilitating the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 78 JUDICATURE 180, 180–81 (1994). 
253 Barkow, supra note 252, at 314. 
254 Under the federal Guidelines, the minimum interval for a range is 6 months and the widest 
interval is 81 months (not including ranges that extend from 360 months to a life sentence). U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). In Pennsylvania, 
sentencing intervals for the standard sentencing range can be as narrow as 1 month or as wide as 18 
months, and up to 42 months including the mitigated and aggravated ranges. For ranges that include a 
life sentence, the widest range extends from 72 months to life. 204 PA. CODE § 303.16(a) (2015). 
255 See generally, Douglas A. Berman, Balanced and Purposeful Departures: Fixing a 
Jurisprudence that Undermines the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 21 
(2000). 
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Conceptually, ex post construction of sentencing recommendations is 
aligned with common law practices for the development of law. Although, 
doctrinally, a sentence in one case does not pose a precedent for future 
cases, it nevertheless carries informational value that should not be 
disregarded completely. And while the rationale for not using individual 
sentences as precedent is that they constitute particular case outcomes, not 
general rules, valuable knowledge can be gained from looking at the 
patterns arising from sentencing decisions in the aggregate. 
Early reformers of the Sentencing Commission saw importance in 
learning from the exercise of judicial discretion in particular cases and in 
utilizing appellate review to “facilitate the development of a ‘common law 
of sentencing’ to buttress and supplement the guidelines.”256 The federal 
Sentencing Guidelines were developed based on an extensive statistical 
analysis of sentencing patterns and the variables affecting them.257 The 
“characteristic institutional role” of the Sentencing Commission is to “take 
account of ‘empirical data and national experience,’”258 and that is the 
fundamental reason why sentencing guidelines have continued to serve as a 
baseline in sentencing even under an advisory regime. When sentencing 
guidelines are not based on empirical data but rather on political pressure 
from legislatures (as in the case of the federal crack cocaine Guidelines), 
judges are granted greater leeway to depart based on policy disagreement, 
and “a categorical disagreement with and variance from the Guidelines is 
not suspect.”259 
Statistical curving, therefore, is conceptually what sentencing 
guidelines are meant to be based on. Historically, before the heavy reliance 
on computerization, we used the closest approximation possible—
sentencing commissions were charged with collecting massive amounts of 
data on sentencing and translating it into sentencing ranges based on 
different offense and offender characteristics. Today, statistical curving can 
provide judges with an additional—and a more effective—tool to support 
decisionmaking in particular cases. 
The sentencing curves offered by statistical curving could fulfill the 
desire of commissioners, judges, and scholars for a mechanism to enhance 
256 MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT § 3-208 cmt. (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS 
ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1979). 
257 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS (1987); see also Stephen Breyer, Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
Revisited, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 180, 181 (1999) (explaining how the Commission based Guidelines 
punishments on “typical past practice”). 
258 Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007) (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d. 
1154, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007)). 
259 Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 264 (2009) (per curiam). 
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uniformity across the sentences actually ordered. The continually updating 
nature of such curving, based on dynamic sentencing trends, would also 
allow for flexibility and updating of the sentencing curve based on judicial 
practices. And connecting the information on such trends in easily 
displayed curves across judges and courts can guard against increased 
disparities. 
2. Uniformity of Sentencing in the Post-Booker Era.—Curving
discretion does not just fit logically within the guidelines enterprise in an 
improved and enhanced way. In the post-Booker era, it will also be more 
effective than the guidelines matrices in addressing sentencing disparities 
without raising the same constitutional concerns. 
The Supreme Court decision in United States v. Booker held 
unconstitutional the mandatory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines.260 The 
Court also explicitly stated its position that advisory guidelines or wide 
judicial discretion do not pose the same difficulty. As the Court 
emphasized: 
If the Guidelines as currently written could be read as merely advisory 
provisions that recommended, rather than required, the selection of particular 
sentences in response to differing sets of facts, their use would not implicate 
the Sixth Amendment. We have never doubted the authority of a judge to 
exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory range . . . . 
For when a trial judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence 
within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury determination of 
the facts that the judge deems relevant.261 
The Court also acknowledged the importance of uniformity in its 
decision not to strike down the Guidelines completely but rather to “make 
the Guidelines system advisory while maintaining a strong connection 
between the sentence imposed and the offender’s real conduct—a 
connection important to the increased uniformity of sentencing that 
Congress intended its Guidelines system to achieve.”262 Advisory 
guidelines can assist in enhancing uniformity to the extent judges follow 
the guidelines’ recommendations. But in later cases, the Court emphasized 
that “[the district judge] may not presume that the Guidelines range is 
reasonable . . . . He must make an individualized assessment based on the 
260 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
261 Id. at 233; see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 352 (2007) (“This Court’s Sixth 
Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not 
determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence . . . . The Sixth Amendment question, 
the Court has said, is whether the law forbids a judge to increase a defendant’s sentence unless the 
judge finds facts that the jury did not find (and the offender did not concede).”). 
262 Booker, 543 U.S. at 246. 
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facts presented.”263 The question is: How will uniformity be achieved where 
judges do not follow advisory guidelines? 
Appellate judges could perform the role of overseeing sentencing 
decisions. But once guidelines are only advisory, departure from the 
guidelines ranges no longer merits de novo review on appeal.264 Instead, the 
Booker decision directed courts of appeals to “review sentencing decisions 
for unreasonableness.”265 Consequently, “courts of appeals must review all 
sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the 
Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard”266— 
which makes vacatur of sentencing decisions rare. Indeed, the implications 
for appellate review were emphasized by the dissent in Booker, and the 
majority conceded, “We cannot and do not claim that use of a 
‘reasonableness’ standard will provide the uniformity that Congress 
originally sought to secure.”267 
After Booker, therefore, if one cares about achieving uniformity in 
sentencing, the goal should be to find a mechanism that facilitates appellate 
review of departures that is constitutional. Sentencing curves can be such a 
mechanism, and they pass the Booker test: They do not impose rigid, 
legislature-created ranges that are tied to factual findings; rather, they 
provide information to judges on how to apply their discretion based on the 
similar sentences ordered in similar cases. Appellate courts could vacate 
extreme sentences under such a model because heightened scrutiny on 
appeal is not based on the mandatory nature of the guidelines; it is based on 
the distance of the sentence in the particular case from the majority view of 
the courts. 
3. The Political Economy of Sentencing.—Numerous discussions
have focused around the political economy of sentencing, and those are 
largely outside the scope of this Article. What this Section emphasizes, 
however, is several key points as to how the implementation of statistical 
curving can fit within that discourse. 
First, regarding sentencing levels. If one subscribes to the view that 
legislatures are the ones that should determine sentencing levels, statistical 
curving does not undermine such a view. Legislated sentencing limits could 
be achieved through mandatory minimum and statutory maximum 
sentences, as others before me have suggested in the wake of Blakely v. 
263 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50 (2007); see also Rita, 551 U.S. at 350–51. 
264 Booker, 543 U.S. at 259. 
265 Id. at 264. 
266 Gall, 552 U.S. at 41. 
267 Booker, 543 U.S. at 263. 
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Washington.268 In such a world where binding lower and upper limits on 
sentencing are statutorily prescribed, the proposed statistical curving would 
be bounded by such limits on both ends, but it would still provide judges a 
useful tool for applying sentences within the range.269 The addition of 
statistical curving on top of any statutory limits would help standardize 
sentencing across different judges and courts over one joint curve. 
Current penal–constitutional jurisprudence, however, has taken a 
different direction, implying judges should have broad discretion over 
sentencing.270 The Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized that wide 
sentencing discretion by judges does not violate the Sixth Amendment but 
that narrower mandatory sentencing ranges do.271 Justice Antonin Scalia’s 
dissent in Booker highlights that: “Since the Guidelines are not binding . . . 
the sentencing judge need only state that ‘this court does not believe that 
the punishment set forth in the Guidelines is appropriate for this sort of 
offense.’”272 Using the ranges prescribed by the Guidelines as a baseline in 
sentencing has been upheld because the Commission based the ranges on 
the actual sentences imposed in cases.273 And where sentencing ranges are 
not the product of an empirical investigation but rather of political 
influence by Congress, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Kimbrough v. 
United States274 and Spears v. United States275 allow judges to depart based 
on policy disagreement with the Guidelines. In a world that subscribes to 
the view that judges should be the ones determining sentencing levels but 
also wishes to maintain broad uniformity in sentencing, statistical curving 
that is based on the aggregation of actual judicial decisions can provide a 
mechanism to increase uniformity while placing the responsibility over 
sentencing levels with the judiciary. 
268 542 U.S. 296 (2004); see, e.g., Barkow, supra note 252, at 312–13; Stephanos Bibas, Blakely’s 
Federal Aftermath, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 333, 338–39 (2004). 
269 It is similarly irrelevant whether statutory ranges are based on a matrix of offense gravity and 
the offender’s prior record (as in the current guidelines regime) or on offense categories alone (as in 
guidelines-less states). Whatever the parameters that sentencing ranges are based on, statistical curving 
can guide decisions within such ranges. 
270 See, e.g., Richman, supra note 154, at 1376 (“In the Supreme Court, the trio of Rita v. United 
States, Gall v. United States, and Kimbrough v. United States enshrined the reasonable district court as 
the ineffable place where federal criminal policy, sentencing philosophy, and individualized judgment 
merge.” (footnotes omitted)). 
271 Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 352 (2007); Booker, 543 U.S. at 233; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 
308–09. 
272 Booker, 543 U.S. at 305 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part). 
273 Rita, 551 U.S. at 350–51; Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). 
274 552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
275 555 U.S. 261, 264–66 (2009) (per curiam). 
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Statistical curving can also enrich the current discourse regarding the 
political economy of sentencing guidelines by highlighting three key 
points. First, statistical curving does not raise the same separation of 
powers concerns that the promulgation of fact-specific sentencing ranges 
by sentencing commissions raises and can help to distinguish between 
practical necessity and theoretical desirability of that delegation.276 
Constitutionally, statistical curving does not remove from the judicial 
branch the power to set sentencing ranges in categories any narrower than 
those offered by the penal code, as it is under a guidelines regime.277 That is 
because the range offered by statistical curving is determined by the actual 
sentences imposed by judges, not by the prescribed range set by 
legislatures. Following, they also do not raise the problem of entrusting the 
Sentencing Commission with “legislative power outright and not as an 
incident to some other executive or judicial function.”278 Today, where 
statistical curving based on judicial decisions is practically feasible, this 
can dissipate the rationale for the historical constitutional bargain that 
placed such power in the hands of the Commission. 
Once uniformity can be achieved organically, the discourse on 
involvement in sentencing by legislatures and sentencing commissions 
should be transparent about its focus on questions of harshness and 
leniency—questions of magnitude, not of range. To the extent desired, 
those could be achieved through mandatory minimum and statutory 
maximum sentences, as mentioned above. But that discourse, as well, 
would benefit from directly addressing the desire for punitiveness or 
leniency unbundled from the captivating rhetoric about fighting disparities. 
Second, forming guidelines recommendations in such a dynamic 
manner could have an additional benefit. It is not so much about the 
identity of the body setting the ranges; it is about the point in time when the 
ranges are set. The specific time when any decision is made—including 
decisions about sentencing matrices—is a time that creates opportunities 
for focused political influences that then continue to be entrenched through 
the matrices as they are adopted and used. Dynamic curves can avoid such 
276 In Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), the Court rejected the challenge to the 
constitutionality of the Commission and its Guidelines and concluded that Congress had not violated 
the separation of powers principle or the nondelegation doctrine (over the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Scalia). Yet, scholars have continued to raise such concerns in the following years. See, e.g., Rachel E. 
Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989 (2006); Bibas, supra note 
268, at 336, 340. Since 1989, the Court has also changed its guidelines jurisprudence on some issues, 
including Booker’s removal of the mandatory force of the sentencing guidelines. 543 U.S. at 233 
(majority opinion). 
277 See Barkow, supra note 252; Barkow, supra note 276, at 1028, 1041–42. 
278 Barkow, supra note 276, at 1041–42. 
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influence points because they are updated simply by sentencing practices 
themselves. 
In criminal law in particular, the outcomes of such political decision 
points tend not to reflect a legislative compromise or current social views 
but rather tend to converge on more extreme options.279 One reason for this 
tendency is the cumulative nature of criminal and sentencing laws, where 
each political decision point often is affected by the social battles and high-
profile, heinous cases of the era.280 Another is the one-sidedness of interest 
groups’ pressure on such issues.281 From the procedural perspective, a main 
problem is that criminal law and sentencing law do not define rules in 
whose shadow parties bargain; they define a menu of options for 
prosecutors to choose from. High penalties may be desirable to legislators 
even if they exceed their real sentencing preferences and even when they 
do not shift actual sentencing practices. Because the public understands that 
prosecutors have discretion, harsher penalties mainly move the locus of 
public criticism from the policy choice by the legislature to the 
implementation of that policy by the prosecutor in the particular case.282 In 
a reality where the overwhelming majority of cases are resolved by plea 
bargains, basing sentencing recommendations on actual sentences will 
increase the likelihood that sentences reflect social views. 
This brings me to my last point. Regardless of one’s position on the 
separation of powers between legislators and judges, in practice many 
believe the substantial sentencing power lies neither with judges nor 
legislators but rather with the prosecutor’s office. Much criticism has been 
heard that current guidelines do not necessarily minimize real disparities 
but rather shift discretion from judges to prosecutors and shift the decision 
point from the in-court adjudication to the plea bargain.283 This is 
279 Id. at 1029–30; William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 505, 549 (2001) [hereinafter Stuntz, Pathological Politics of Criminal Law]; William J. Stuntz, 
Reply: Criminal Law’s Pathology, 101 MICH. L. REV. 828 (2002) [hereinafter Stuntz, Criminal Law’s 
Pathology]. 
280 William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2548, 2558 (2004). 
281 Stuntz, Criminal Law’s Pathology, supra note 279, at 836. 
282 Stuntz, supra note 280, at 2557 (“[W]ho bears the blame if something goes wrong—if 
sympathetic defendants are punished or if unsympathetic defendants are punished more harshly than the 
public thinks just? In the United States, the answer is almost always the overzealous prosecutor, not the 
overcriminalizing or oversentencing legislator.”); see also Stuntz, Pathological Politics of Criminal 
Law, supra note 279, at 547–57; Stuntz, Criminal Law’s Pathology, supra note 279, at 836. 
283 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 18, at 926–28 (explaining that “[t]he sentencing reform 
movement has not restricted sentencing discretion so much as it has transferred discretion from judges 
to prosecutors”); Alschuler, supra note 154, at 102 (reviewing the empirical findings and concluding 
that “[t]he best judgment . . . is that some reduction in judge-produced disparity was more than offset by 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1278 
concerning not only because of the difference in the public roles of judges 
and prosecutors but also because, to the extent disparities are masked by 
charging and factual agreements, they are harder to detect and overcome.284 
Further, the more restricted judges are relative to prosecutors, the greater 
the pressure on a defendant to reach a plea bargain and the less reliable are 
such pleas of guilt and the outcomes of such proceedings.285 Scholars, 
practitioners, and judges have warned of the following implications that are 
not limited to sentencing—there is also a drift away from the adversarial 
model, reduced transparency, and reduced possibility to challenge the 
government conduct or to challenge the government’s version of the 
events.286 Enhancing the ability and legitimacy of judges to sentence based 
an increase in prosecutor-produced disparity”); Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing 
of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 877 (2009) (“The United 
States Sentencing Guidelines . . . have also increased prosecutorial leverage by curbing judicial 
sentencing discretion. They have prompted more pleas and fewer trials.”) [hereinafter Barkow, 
Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors]; Rachel E. Barkow, Sentencing Guidelines at the 
Crossroads of Politics and Expertise, 160 U. PA L. REV. 1599, 1622–25 (2012) (“As long as guidelines 
apply only to judges, they will never resolve the disparity in the system and in fact may end up 
exacerbating the disparity by failing to provide a valuable check on prosecutors.”); Bowman, Failure of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 17, at 1336–39 (discussing the “increasing array of tools 
for controlling sentencing outcomes” given to prosecutors); Freed, supra note 18, 1697–98 (describing 
the Sentencing Guidelines as “administrative handcuffs that are applied to judges” but not to 
prosecutors); Richman, supra note 154, at 1386 (“With substantial control over the flow of offense-
related facts to the judge . . . prosecutors were left with unprecedented sway over sentencing.”); Daniel 
C. Richman et al., Panel Discussion: The Expanding Prosecutorial Role from Trial Counsel to
Investigator and Administrator, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 679, 682–87 (1999) (Judge John S. Martin’s 
critique of the “secret nature” of the Guidelines, and “the totally non-public, non-reviewable discretion 
that is in fact given to some people who are as old as twenty-nine”); Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. 
Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its 
Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1284 (1997) (concluding that prosecutorial 
sentencing discretion “if unchecked, has the potential to recreate the very disparities that the Sentencing 
Reform Act was intended to alleviate”); Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1471, 1475 (1993) (noting that the Guidelines have “curtailed judges’ 
ability to constrain prosecutors”); STITH & CABRANES, supra note 252, at 130 (explaining that 
“prosecutorial discretion is now greater relative to judicial discretion in criminal sentencing”); Kate 
Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 
1420, 1425 (2008) (noting that the Guidelines “provided prosecutors with indecent power relative to 
both defendants and judges”). 
284 Barkow, supra note 276, at 1027–28; Richman et al., supra note 283, at 687. 
285 For some vivid examples, see David E. Patton, Federal Public Defense in an Age of Inquisition, 
122 YALE L.J. 2578 (2013); Richman et al., supra note 283, at 686 (comments of Judge John S. 
Martin). For a theoretical analysis explaining why, when statutory punishments exceed prosecutorial 
sentencing preferences, the settlement curve reflects the same punishments even for cases of lower 
evidentiary strength, see Stuntz, supra note 280, at 2552–53, and Richman et al., supra note 283, at 
689–90 (comments of Judge Gerard E. Lynch). 
286 Barkow, supra note 276, at 1034, 1047–48; Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of 
Prosecutors, supra note 283, at 878–79; Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal 
Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117 (1988); Patton, supra note 285, at 2598; Richman et al., supra note 
283, at 686; Stuntz, Criminal Law’s Pathology, supra note 279, at 829, 832, 838. 
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on the sentencing curves—themselves based on de facto “going rates”—
will give judges the same power of discretion already held by prosecutors. 
CONCLUSION 
Defining courts’ scope of jurisdiction and assigning judges to dockets 
are commonly viewed as administrative decisions. Further, viewing judicial 
professionalism as a virtue has cultivated a movement towards increased 
specialization in the courts—resulting in varying types of case 
concentrations often decided on at the locality level. This Article identifies 
an additional effect of case assignments: they affect the substance of 
judicial decisions as well. 
Because legal judgments are relative, the decision in a particular case 
depends on the contours of the other cases in judicial caseloads. Relative 
judgments can inject concerning arbitrariness into judicial decisions in 
particular cases based on caseload compositions. Worse, relative judgments 
can systematically bias sentencing practices across courts of different 
subject matter or geographic jurisdiction. This Article demonstrates how 
such relative judgments are evident across many courts of limited 
jurisdiction—from courts under two-tiered models focusing on only 
misdemeanors or felonies to specialized courts such as juvenile courts and 
domestic violence divisions. It also illustrates how relative judgments are 
associated with the development of geographic disparities in sentencing. 
The normative implications are extensive. If the types of cases under 
the jurisdiction of the courts affect the substance of the decisions reached, 
this means that decisions about the division of jurisdiction are not merely 
administrative. They entail a decision about sentencing levels themselves 
by nudging the sentencing curve in a particular direction. In light of the 
variance in court models, the increased movement toward specialization in 
the courts and the great discretion given to local court administrators in 
case assignments, such consequences are especially concerning. From the 
policymaker’s perspective, as specialization becomes increasingly 
prevalent in the legal system, connecting divergence in outcomes to 
institutional capacity—and learning the reasons for any such influences—
can serve as important tools in implementing future policies. It can also 
shed new light on the role of other institutions in the chain of sentencing, 
including parole boards and courts of appeals. 
The effect of relative judgments can also help explain why guidelines 
have been less successful in certain areas than others. In an important 
sense, the increasing movement towards specialization in the courts 
inherently undermines the quest for uniformity in sentencing. And it 
undermines it in a particularly disturbing way because the sentencing 
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curves that develop are not based on any penologically relevant 
considerations. Such biased sentencing clearly undermines notions of 
justice and equitable treatment because similarly situated defendants are 
sentenced differently. At the same time, such sentencing disparities cannot 
be justified as the price we pay for judicial discretion. It is not that 
sentencing differentials reflect differences in judicial ideology because 
even the same judge might impose different sentences based on her 
exposure to different cases. This is also not about emphasizing 
individualization in sentencing because the decision in a particular case is 
affected by the characteristics of the other cases in the group of cases 
before the judge. Furthermore, because courts of limited jurisdiction often 
concentrate on relatively less serious offenses, specialization will also often 
be associated with increased punitiveness. 
In light of the wide effect of relative judgments in the criminal justice 
system, this Article also suggests complementing existing sentencing 
guidelines with statistical curving. Exposing judges to the overall 
punishment curve, across all courts and jurisdictions, would enable better 
standardization of particular sentences in a way that would promote 
consistency across courts and judges. It would also enable appellate courts 
to perform an overarching role in reviewing and standardizing sentencing 
levels. 
